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Abstract 
Egypt has a large profitable football industry that increasingly attracts the attention of 
both football agents wanting to earn income from another market and sub-Saharan 
football players hoping to further a career by using Egypt as an intermediary between 
their home countries and Europe.  The labor migration of sub-Saharan football players to 
Egypt has been enabled mainly by neoliberal, market-orientated changes adopted by 
FIFA, the CAF, the European Union, and the Egyptian football industry itself.  Yet more 
importantly it is the individual actors that implement and take advantage of these 
hegemonic spheres of influence.  This thesis explores how these individual actors and 
sub-Saharan football players have negotiated the neoliberal project.  Specifically it shows 
the changes brought by localized mutations of neoliberalism as well as its continuities 
how they affect the ways in which sub-Saharan football players in Egypt move, work, 
and live. 
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Charles, Nigeria, 23 years old  
Charles is playing for his second club in Egypt where he has been for several years. 
 
Napoleon, Nigeria 
Napoleon was traded to Egypt, where he has lived for the last five years. 
 
Mouctar, Cote D’Ivoire  
Mouctar is a well-traveled player who has developed his skills in two other Arab 
countries. 
 
Henry, Ghana, 21 Years old 
Henry came to Egypt with the help of an agent and completed a successful try-out. 
 
Thomas, Nigeria, early 20’s,  
Thomas earns $200 (U.S) a month with a second division team in Egypt.  
 
Aquib, Nigeria, mid 20’s 
Aquib is an uncontracted player who came to Egypt independently without an agent.  
 
Zinedine, Guinea, 25 years old (football age, 18) 
He chose to come to Egypt alone and had to work in a café to survive in Cairo. 
 
Paul, (country not designated to protect identity), mid-20’s,  
An Egyptian agent recruited Paul after competing against Egypt’s National team. 
 
Maleek, Nigeria 
Maleek has been in Egypt for a year since he tried out with the aid of his agent. 
 
Castro, Ghana, 23 years old 
Castro’s current club paid his transfer fees from his club in Ghana. 
 
Martin, Ghana, 27 years old (football age, 21) 
Martin wants to become a ‘coordinator’, connecting talent with agents. 
 
Fred, Ghana, 23 years old 
Fred hopes to use football in order to travel abroad to further his studies. 
 
Ricky, Ghana, 23 years old (football age, 21) 
Ricky contract is almost finished.  He is unsure where his career is headed. 
 viii 
Sports Agents 
 
Mohammed, Egyptian football agent 
Mohammed is the enemy of fans and clubs.  His sole end is to move players abroad. 
 
Ehab, Former Egyptian football agent 
Ehab left the trade because he need to more stability and time with his family.
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Introduction 
In the last interview I conducted for this thesis, a Ghanaian football1 player in 
Cairo, Egypt named Castro responded to a question about the importance of having a 
developed curriculum vitae:  “Some of the coaches, they look at your CVs and your 
DVDs and then they invite you for a try-out…Some of them look at it and they buy you 
straight away.”  With this answer Castro gives insight into his subjective experience 
while he also interprets, in a wider sense, the employment of football players by football 
clubs as something gained through a purchase.  Though this might be a simple 
observation, it is relevant to a broader situation. 
 In Castro’s case, his present Egyptian club “bought” him when it negotiated a 
transfer fee with his former Ghanaian club in order to obtain the legal right to employ the 
player.  These transactions of labor have grown exponentially since the 1980s within the 
global football industry, which occur both locally and transnationally.  Based on original 
ethnographic research including the personal accounts of football players like Castro in 
addition to an in-depth research of secondary resources on the subject of football 
migration, this thesis shows among other things that a series of neoliberal, market-
oriented changes within FIFA and the European Union regulations as well as club 
activities in the 1980s and 1990s have facilitated the dramatic increase of football labor 
migration globally.  This thesis argues that these transformations and neoliberalism are 
mediated through cultural situations, economic ideology, individuals, and personalities 
such as team managers, which together facilitate a sub-Saharan player’s migration to 
Egypt while also simultaneously shaping his subjective experience of this migration and 
                                                1 Like much of the world and previous academic literature, I use the term football to reference what 
Americans refer to as soccer.    
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the life he establishes in Egypt.   Football players' experiences of migration to Egypt are 
conditioned not only more generally by a hegemonic neoliberal regime that has 
developed new ways of commodifying and objectifying players but also by more specific 
networks of agents that ensure that, despite a hegemonic overarching framework of 
neoliberalism, different players are experiencing it in different ways and in different 
places depending on chance encounters. 
Some of these transformations that are mediated through individuals and 
economic ideology are as follows: In 1981 FIFA implemented a ruling that forced clubs 
to release their players so that they can join their national teams for international 
competition around the world.   A year later, FIFA followed up this change by 
eliminating limitations on the number for overseas club players allowed to compete for a 
national team in international competition (Alegi 2010:93).  Known as the Bosman 
Ruling, in December 1995 the European Court of Justice created free agency by ruling it 
illegal for clubs in European Union countries to charge a transfer fee for a player whose 
contract had expired (Magee and Sugden 2002: 425).   Probably the single most 
significant change of all has been the decision to increase and even completely deregulate 
the foreign player quotas in individual national football associations, which opened up 
spaces for more foreign labor.  For example, England completely deregulated their labor 
market to allow for any number of foreign nationals2, which has come with much 
criticism from fans and nationalists.   
                                                2 The transnationalism of the European Union has effectively complicated the concept of a foreign player 
(a non-national) within its territory.  After the Bosman Ruling, it became illegal to restrict the employment 
opportunities of foreign European Union member citizens within and between Member European Union 
National Leagues.  This ruling was extended in 2003 under the Kolpak Ruling to include citizens of certain 
non-member states that has signed association agreements with the European Union such as Slovakia, 
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Prior to these (de)regulations players were transferred between clubs, but they 
occurred at a rate far less than presently experienced.  Driven by specific neoliberal 
policies, these laws have effectively lessened the regulation of player movement within 
the global football industry and have significantly impacted African football.  My thesis 
focuses precisely on the intricate ways in which these neoliberal transformations in the 
African football scene affect the everyday experiences of sub-Saharan African football 
players when they migrate to and live in Egypt.  
Based on Mensah’s (2008) definition, I understand neoliberalism as a bundle of 
ideologies and policies that seek to further expand global capital accumulation through 
free trade, financial deregulation, and privatization with the assistance of the World 
Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Trade Organization (WTO), and their 
associated organizations (1).  Furthermore, as Harvey (2005) has described, neoliberalism 
is a theory of political economy, which “proposes that human well-being can best be 
advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an 
institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets and 
free trade” (2). Specifically with regards to the football industry, neoliberalism has taken 
hold of and thoroughly influenced the industry thereby creating a completely new socio-
economic landscape in which football players compete, live, and move.    
As a result, borders have been loosened and the relationship between employer and 
employee has become casualized.   
Although in the first instance employing concepts such as “loosening of borders” 
makes neoliberalism come across as a simple and vague phenomenon, the localization of 
                                                
which at the time was not a member of the European Union.  Therefore a foreign player indicates an 
individual who does not fall under either of these rulings. 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neoliberalism is a very complex process with sometimes counter-intuitive effects.  For 
example, the glamorous life that one imagines when thinking about professional football 
players, in particular the earning of large salaries, the opportunity to travel, the potential 
celebrity status, various endorsement deals, and the opportunity to play in heated 
competition, is in direct contrast to the lives of the players I have talked to in Egypt.  As I 
address in chapter one, merely looking at the large amounts of capital that circulates 
within the Egyptian football industry, one might conclude that this glamorous life indeed 
exists for all the players in Egypt (and it does for the top Egyptian players).  However the 
experience of sub-Saharan football players in Egypt is very different.  Most of them find 
their lives to be quite boring, repetitive, and overly controlled by their employers.   
Neoliberalism struggles to come to terms with its simultaneous counter intuitive 
support of individualism and corporatism.  In order to navigate this tension, neoliberalism 
has justified more business friendly practices because corporations provide individuals 
with capital to consume.  Counter to this, neoliberal thought has through the regulations 
discussed earlier actually in this introduction, favored the individual player and facilitated 
a decrease in the formal commodification of football players globally because of the 
creation of unrestricted free agency.  A club no longer has any legal rights to retention 
once a player’s contract has finished.  Previously, through the retention system, an 
interested club was obligated to pay an indemnity to gain right to employ the player they 
desire even after the expiration of the player’s contract with his previous employer.   
Players are no longer contractually obligated through a retention system to negotiate with 
their club after the expiration of their contract in order to be allowed to play for another 
club.  Despite the formal rules, the manner in which players described being traded and 
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employed such as Castro did in this introduction invokes a subjective experience that 
remains being a commodity and a object because of the neoliberal and commercialized 
regime they live in.  The language of commodification has become so ingrained in their 
thought that they refer to themselves within classical neoliberal economic terms that seep 
into their everyday language. 
The ultimate mutations of neoliberalism are unpredictable because its final 
implementation relies on local actors, certain situations, and a very particular cultural 
context in Egypt.  There is a confluence of individual actors, social and cultural norms, 
the Egyptian government, and a global phenomenon of neoliberalism.  They shape the 
local situation for the sub-Saharan African football players in this thesis.  While these 
local regimes and actors constitute neoliberalism, in this specific context, we must always 
remember that neoliberalism and its discursive effects also constitutes the actors and local 
regimes as well.  It is the totality of all these actors and factors that propel sub-Saharan 
football labor migration to Egypt and create a unique subjective experience during their 
time abroad. 
This thesis aims to answer the following questions: What role does Egypt play in 
this larger global football industry?  How do players and agents experience this role? 
How does Egypt’s role within the neoliberal global football industry enable and facilitate 
sub-Saharan football labor migration to Egypt?  How do these players navigate these 
hegemonic regimes of influence in their everyday lives?  In answering these questions, 
this thesis brings together ethnographic research into conversation with several bodies of 
scholarly inquiry.  I examine previous literature about football in the social sciences and I 
also engage with concepts of labor and commodities as the second area of inquiry.  
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Lastly, I explore interpretations of how commercialization and neoliberalism has affected 
the global football industry, while further addressing how these processes facilitate 
international labor migration. 
Football and the Social Sciences 
Much of the social science literature on football has focused on the consumption 
side, especially fandom, with a resulting preoccupation with questions of identity.  As 
there is a wide body of literature on the subject of identity, I will choose to concentrate on 
two predominant themes: syntactic and semantic forms as well as ritualistic group 
experience, which are used to theorize football identities in the context of fandom.  These 
scholars’ insights regarding identity and fandom are highly relevant to Egypt and shape 
how sub-Saharan football players see themselves in relation to their fans.   
 Giulianotti (1999) suggests that social identities are structured through football 
rivalries are constructed through semantic (defining themselves by understandings of 
what they are) and syntactic (defining themselves based on understandings of what they 
are not) forms.  He argues that football identities tend to favor syntactic formations in 
realizing themselves through oppositions that is inherent within competition.  Giulianotti 
claims that these binary and sometimes triangular oppositions formed by structured 
relations, shape the identity of fans, players, teams, managers, and other staff.  Similarly, 
Dimeo (2001) argues that the identities of two rival clubs in Calcutta are created in 
relation to and in contrasting discourses of “the other.”  These fans identify themselves 
through acknowledging the “other” as something they are not. 
  In contrast to Dimeo (2005) and Giulianotti (1999), Robson (2000) develop the 
idea of commemorative ritualization, which draws upon previous scholarly work by 
Bourdieu (1977), Connerton (1989), and Bloch (1989) to understand how groups provide 
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individuals with memory and a collective imaginary.   These groups frame and localize 
memory through “mapping” or locating memories within material and mental spaces.  
Robson sees the rituals of football fans as not isolable cultural events, “but rather an 
extension of the everyday, a collective practice premised upon the summoning up of an 
operational and activated holistic (bodily, affective) experience of group identity and 
tradition” (9).  Robson argues that football fan identity is embodied and expressed 
commemoratively within habitual group experience, which simultaneously convey and 
maintain collective knowledge of the past.  
Sub-Saharan football players in Egypt become fully aware of these football 
identities when they or their colleagues are publicly noticed and sometimes encouraged 
by sports fans to improve their game by being subject to physical assault.  Yet this fan 
centered approach predominant in the literature has left actual football players 
unexamined.  There is a relative lack of ethnographic research conducted on professional 
football players with the notable exceptions of Magee and Sugden (2002), who used 
qualitative methods to complete a typology of football migrants in Europe and Kelly and 
Waddington (2006) who argued that managerial control and abuse stems from the 
traditional authority that managers embody within professional football in Britain and 
Ireland.    
The dramatics of a Zamalek-Ahly derby gives the point of view that for fans the 
club’s success is the ultimate goal as well as perhaps harassing the opposing team’s fans.  
Sub-Saharan players experience football from a starkly opposing viewpoint.  They 
neither share fans’ collective knowledge of the past nor experience the commemorative 
ritualizations, which fans as a group experience.  There is a disjuncture between fan 
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identity and a sub-Saharan football player who cares little about a team’s longtime rival.   
Though winning the Egyptian Cup would be an achievement, football players do not 
experience it in the same way as a fan would.  Sub-Saharan players see beating Ahly or 
winning the Egyptian Cup not as a triumph over a rival, but as a means of garnering 
exposure to lead to better contracts and positions abroad.  This thesis provides a player 
centered point of view missing in previous literature. 
This dearth in the literature can partly be attributed to a lack of access to 
professional football players.  Many clubs limit their players’ abilities to discuss the club 
without authorization or supervision.  Moreover, the ability to contact a sports celebrity 
presents significant challenges to an ethnographer in comparison to the easy access to 
fans.  Fortunately, my research in this thesis has been able to deviate in certain situations 
from this pattern.  However, my gender presented its own limitations in conducting 
participant observation of football practices and a player’s interaction with club staff 
because as a woman I was unable to attend practices or team related meetings and social 
events.  Club rules also made it a risk to talk to me because players were restricted from 
interacting with women to whom they were not married.  The topic of interactions 
between females and sub-Saharan football players is put into context in chapters four and 
five.  
Labor and Commodities 
 
Previous football literature has used the concept of commodification to discuss 
club produced branded merchandise, football imagery used as commercial vehicles of 
non-sport related organizations, and relationships between fans and market-orientated 
clubs (see Giulianotti 2002, 2005a, 2005b; Ben-Porat 2009; Conn 1998, 2004; McGill 
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2002; Wagg 2004).  However in Moor’s (2007) analysis of past literature, she argues that 
the concepts of consumption, commodification, and class are over-generalized within 
these works.  Perhaps most significant in her analysis is her observation that many of 
these authors seem to confuse commodification and consumption for what is really taking 
place in the football industry that being commercialization (132).  In order to 
theoretically understand commodification of sub-Saharan football players in Egypt, I 
look outside of football literature and engage Karl Marx’s manuscript, Capital, A 
Critique of Political Economy (1906) in understanding the player position as a labor 
source.   In contrast to previous literature, I use the concept of commodification 
specifically to describe the process by which an object, services, or something 
traditionally neither a good nor service (such as human beings or the environment) is 
given value with intrinsic aspects defined by Marx (Polyani 2004: 4).  Labor and 
commodities are important concepts that help to explain the dynamic of a player’s 
employment.   
To understand these concepts, I looked at particularly Marx’s theories.  I take 
from his work understandings of a commodity, use-value, exchange-value, and price. 
These concepts are relevant to understanding the hegemonic regimes sub-Saharan 
football players are subject to because their subjective experience is connected with 
understandings of commmodification and objectification.  Every commodity has a price, 
a use-value, and an exchange-value.  The use-value represents the utility of the 
commodity, the exchange-value is the value of the commodity in relation to other 
commodities, and lastly the price refers to the monetary exchange-value (Marx 1906:42).  
Inherent in the process of commodification is objectification, which I define using 
 11 
Foucault’s (1994) definition in which a person is objectified when he or she becomes a 
subject.  In chapter four, I bring together this concept of surplus value and the rest of 
Marx’s work on labor and commodities with Becker’s (1975) theory of human capital to 
rethink and examine commodification in a neoliberal context.  
Contemporary studies of labor in anthropology concentrate on transnational and 
domestic migration as well as mutations of neoliberalism on labor practices.  In a recent 
study of labor, anthropologist Aiwa Ong (2005) contributes to a new understanding of 
labor practices by exploring the notion of labor arbitrage, which is relevant to this 
research because sub-Saharan football players are used as sources of cheaper labor.  
Arbitrage refers to the practice of buying something at a very low price in one market and 
redistributing it in another higher priced market to exploit price discrepancies.  Although 
arbitrage of items is not new, the arbitrage of labor is.  As an example, Ong uses the case 
of Indian laborers in the high-tech industry who were contracted to work in California but 
at much lower rates than local American hires (2005:160-1).  Like these South Asian 
contract workers in the Silicon Valley, African football players in Egypt and Europe 
represent labor arbitrage where their skills are imported to save costs, thus increasing 
profits for the football clubs that “purchase” them.   
Labor arbitrage allows companies or football clubs to pay one labor pool less than 
another. For example, Alegi (2010) states that the pressure of commercialization has 
forced smaller European clubs to import foreign labor because it allows them to maintain 
competitiveness while earning a profit through lower operational costs (102). In the 
specific case of Egypt the inexpensive imported labor pool includes sub-Saharan players 
(in the past even some Brazilian players).  
 12 
Darby et al. (2007) brings attention to the fact that football clubs also partake in 
off-shoring, which means that this developing labor pool is dislocated geographically, 
through exploiting talent from elsewhere (Ong 2006:160). The global football industry 
based in Europe has realized that labor can be developed and trained in less expensive 
environments through acquisitions of African football clubs and establishment of football 
academies in West Africa.  The most talented developed labor can also be sold, with 
great profit to European clubs (Darby 2007:149).   
Labor arbitrage is pertinent to this research because it commodifies the player by 
instilling them with a territorialized monetary value.  Though on a formal legal level, 
football players are less commodified because of the creation of unrestricted free-agency, 
labor arbitrage remains an unregulated way in which agents and clubs commodify 
players.  The commodification of players has been vastly impacted by commercialization 
and neoliberalization, which have sought to expand profit margins and cut operational 
costs with such tools as labor arbitrage.   Football players are commodified through 
mechanisms that seek to improve the human capital, price, and use-value of the player in 
order to not only improve the overall spectacle of competition, but also for sale in the 
football labor exchange markets. 
Transforming Football Through Neoliberalization and 
Commercialization 
  
A wide body of literature explores the relationship between globalization and 
football in terms of commercial impact and migration (see Magee and Sugden 2002; 
Giulianotti and Robertson 2007a, 2007b, 2007c, 2009; Taylor 2006; Tiesler 2008; Rowe 
2003; Alvito 2007; McGovern 2002; Darby 2002; Close and Askew 2004; Lanfranchi 
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and Taylor 2001), yet there is a lack of literature about neoliberalism’s relationship with 
football.  This thesis aims to fill this gap in the literature through examining 
commercialization in Egypt, a player’s subjective experience, commodifying regimes, 
and how individual actors constitute and take advantage of neoliberal ideals.   
As previously discussed in this introduction, neoliberalism’s deregulating 
influence on the global football industry facilitated the Bosman Ruling as well as the 
regulations implemented by FIFA during the 1980s which together created unrestricted 
free agency.  This influence has been attributed to the increase in football labor migration  
(see Alegi 2010; Lanfranchi and Taylor 2001; Magee and Sugden 2002; Darby et al. 
2007).  In 1981, FIFA implemented a ruling that forced clubs to release players for 
international competition with their national teams (Alegi 2010:93). In addition, in 1982 
the organization rescinded a 1965 ruling which had limited the number of overseas club 
players allowed to compete on a national team to only two (Alegi 2010:93).  This 
represents a tension within neoliberalism that has to negotiate favoring both 
corporatization and individualism, which are two contradictory sides of free market 
ideology.  
Neoliberalism’s focus on generating large amounts of capital operates through the 
commercialization of the sport. Yet, previous literature has not considered 
commercialization within the broader phenomenon of neoliberalism (see Brown 1998; 
Conn 1997; Morrow 2003; King 2003; Sandvoss 2003).  Many scholars have theorized 
commercialization of football, specifically the ways in which it has reshaped how fandom 
is experienced by taking into account how satellite television and relaxed broadcasting 
rules have created new spaces of consumption and experiences for football fans globally 
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(see Crabbe and Brown 2004; Brick 2001; Goldblatt 2006; Dubal 2010).  I share Dubal’s 
(2010) view that neoliberalism’s market driven ideals have made profit and 
corporatization of the game the central focus of its discursive project that is enabled by 
the mechanism of commercialization (125).    
Commercialization is both an outcome and a tool of neoliberalism.  In this thesis, 
I draw upon Bourdieu (1998) for my understanding of commercialization.  Bourdieu 
argues that football became commercialized when association football (domestic leagues) 
was no longer solely played or practiced, but also performed as a spectacle (16).  
Bourdieu (1998) expands upon this viewpoint by not only recognizing that 
commercialization is an extension of the free market and neoliberal polices symbolized 
by the Bosman ruling, but also by addressing the fundamental development that has 
reconstructed football as a form of spectacle, specifically televised spectacle (16-7). 
A major determining principle of all these changes is that alongside football as 
practice, and alongside sport undertaken by amateurs, particularly in small-town 
clubs where people can play amateur sport until they are quite old, has arisen 
football as spectacle.  This latter is produced in order to be commercialized in the 
form of televised spectacle, a commercial product (1998:16). 
This product—football as a commercial product-- is widely accessible to consumers 
worldwide.  Therefore, it takes less capital to explain and interpret the game, as the 
consumer has played and is confident in his or her understanding of what is taking place 
before them (Bourdieu 1998:16).  Furthermore, Bourdieu makes the argument that the 
commercialization of football is a possible reason for scouts to travel to Africa and 
underdeveloped countries, where underprivileged classes serve as nurseries to the 
commercialized football teams in order to be more competitive (1998:16).   This links to 
labor arbitrage where there is a precedent within the European football industry to 
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purchase and create football academies in West Africa as a method of developing labor 
abroad at a cheaper cost. 
Individual Agency in Global Flows of Labor 
 
It is agreed upon in the anthropology of sport that contemporary football labor 
migration is a consequence of current economic and political relations within football 
globally (see Lanfranchi and Taylor 2001: 186; Darby et al. 2007: 143; Taylor 2006: 8). 
Taylor (2006) theorizes that football labor migration “reflects a complex set of linkages 
between specific countries or sets of countries—linkages that have deep social and 
cultural and historical roots” (8).  Current football labor migration scholarship is guided 
by the understanding that migrations flow from South to North following Eurocentric 
neo-colonial patterns (see Lanfranchi and Taylor 2001:186; Darby et al. 2007:143; Poli 
2008:2).  These authors have also incorporated a historical-structuralist perspective from 
within a wider discursive understanding of transnational labor migration to analyze 
football labor migration. 
Marxist thought contributes to the historical-structuralist approaches, which 
includes Wallerstein’s (1997) World-Systems Theory and other dependency theorists (see 
Frank 1967).  They frame “migration in the context of a global economy, core-periphery 
relations, and the development of underdevelopment” (Brettell 2000: 103).  Divisions of 
labor and the proletariat have been internationalized to explain the imbalance between 
high-wage labor importing countries and those with low wages and labor emigration 
(Brettell 2000: 103) by dividing them into the core (the most developed economy), the 
semi-periphery (a buffer and intermediary between the core and the periphery), and the 
periphery (the least developed economies).   
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Multiple authors have adopted this approach in attempting to explain football 
labor migration (see Darby et al 2005; Giulianotti 2005; Magee & Sugden 2002; 
McGovern 2002; Darby 2002).  For example, Giulianotti (2005) argues that football 
clubs, which lie geographically, economically, and symbolically within the periphery, 
adopt a feeder role serving stronger football markets in order to survive, yet keeping in 
mind that this feeder periphery “is itself internally stratified.” Another example is  Darby 
et al (2005), which draws upon Andre Gunder Frank’s (1969) theory of dependent 
underdevelopment. According to Frank western countries represent the “core,” which 
dominate the periphery by controlling the way in which trade is conducted in the global 
capitalist system.  Thus, within this particular theoretical framework Europe is viewed as 
the core of the football industry, and it is the relationship between Europe and the 
periphery that most previous literature of football labor migration has focused on (see 
Darby et al 2005; Giulianotti 2005; Magee & Sugden 2002; McGovern 2002; Darby 
2002). 
Research on the stratification of the periphery within the greater football economy 
includes inter-African football labor migration to South Africa and Asian football labor 
migration to South America (see Corelissen and Solberg 2007:295; Taylor 2006: 29).  
Cornelissen and Solberg (2007) observed that over the last decade South Africa has 
started to emerge as an “intermediary…drawing talent from an African ‘hinterland,’ and 
providing a mostly temporary station to players who seek to gain from its relatively 
advanced training infrastructure” (308).  Past football labor migration research, which 
focused on Europe has acknowledged foreign migrants playing in Egypt, but only within 
a couple of sentences (see Lanfranchi and Taylor 2001: 186; Darby et al. 2007: 143).  
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Going beyond such limited perspectives my research seeks to contribute to the growing 
literature about football labor movement within Africa and between the semi-periphery 
and the periphery. 
Integral to theorizing football labor migration to Egypt is to understand how 
various independent local actors facilitate transnational movement within the context of a 
neoliberal hegemonic sphere of influence that has specifically created easier movement 
between states and resulted in the casualization of employment.  Multiple authors have 
attributed the increase in labor migration during the 1990s to sports agents but they do 
not present an argument that addresses how these local actors perpetuate movement (see 
Lanfranchi and Taylor, 2001; Darby et al. 2007).  Lanfranchi and Taylor (2001) state that 
agents are “crucial in the historical development of the international transfer market [and] 
agents are widely regarded as a key factor in the acceleration of football migration in the 
1990’s” (5).   
Poli (2008) attempts to fill this gap by calling for a different perspective on 
football labor migration that is not solely based on the world systems theory, but also 
employs a connectionist network approach.  It became immediately apparent in my 
research that these sports agents hold a huge amount of influence over a player’s 
migration experience and his decision-making process.  Although dependency and world 
systems theories provide an understanding of migration between more peripheral and 
more central points in the world economic system, they fail to account for the human 
agency involved in any given football player’s migration. 
To understand how independent actors facilitate football labor migration to Egypt, 
I employ the connectionist approach to migration by Meyer (2001), which contends that 
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skilled migration has many active developed networks and channels with an invariable 
number of agents that allow for migration flows from the periphery to the core (92).  
These various agents within the global football industry include football agents, sports 
agents, salaried club recruiters, tipsters, local businessmen, foreign expats, local football 
clubs and teams, and independent and football academies in Western Africa.  Human 
mediation is important to the migration process; it is more than just a minor outlying 
factor, leftover from supply and demand.  As Meyer argues, “they [human agents] are 
more than mere instruments.  They are components and determinants of the migration 
process” (194).  In order to access information about these individual actors, I used 
ethnographic research methods, which are addressed in the following methodology 
section.   
Methodology 
 
In order to answer my thesis question about how sub-Saharan football players in 
Egypt negotiate and navigate different competing hegemonic spheres of influence, I 
looked at how these players are subjectified.  I collected my data over a three-month 
period in the spring of 2010 and over another one-month period in the fall of 2010 when 
the league recommenced after its summer break.  In addition to these specific periods, I 
have maintained friendships with many of the players I interviewed and have continued 
to learn more about their subjectivity and experiences.  While completing the required 
curriculum for this master’s program, I had multiple opportunities to experience and 
observe matches played by the Egyptian national team as well as matches within the 
National Egyptian Football League.  
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 I used two qualitative research methods to conduct my fieldwork: semi-structured 
interviews and participant observation. Participant observation allowed me to build 
relationships with my interviewees, and  these relationships in turn enabled me to gain 
their trust and share some of their social and cultural rituals such as how players negotiate 
public space in Egypt, a Nigerian wedding, and West African food.  I also used 
participant observation as a method of observing Egyptian fandom during the 2010 
World Cup qualification matches against Algeria and important National Egyptian 
League matches.  At these events and other social occasions, I also had informal 
conversations with several other sub-Saharan football players as well as Egyptian football 
fans.  
My main method of acquiring data was through semi-structured interviews with 
football players and sports agents.  I completed ten formal semi-structured interviews 
with thirteen sub-Saharan players and two Egyptian sports agents.  Three of my 
informants showed up with a friend, which was always a pleasant surprise because they 
were able to expand upon each other’s answers.  I tried to ask open-ended questions and 
allowed the players to guide the conversations as much as possible.  As I conducted more 
interviews, certain themes became apparent which allowed me to specifically address 
certain topics, such as age falsification, in subsequent interviews.  These interviews took 
place usually in cafes and on two occasions on a church’s grounds. 
Locating my Sample through Facebook 
  
In February of 2010, I rode the Cairo metro to the suburb of Maadi, where a large 
number of expatriates in Egypt reside, to meet Napoleon who was a Nigerian player 
visiting his friend in Maadi during his weekend off.  Napoleon played football in the 
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Mediterranean city of Alexandria in Lower Egypt.  He was the first person I interviewed.  
I was quite nervous; I was not certain about what to expect.  He drove himself to the cafe 
in his own car provided by the football club.  What I noticed first about him was his hair 
style: neatly braided in cornrows dangling down around his neck.  It was a labor-
intensive hairstyle.  It was obvious that he took great care in his appearance.  He did not 
wear any athletic gear, but styled himself with jeans and a basic t-shirt that allowed his 
large gold necklace to be the center of focus—a display of his wealth.  Both of his ears 
were pierced and seemed to have diamond studs in them.   
I had contacted Napoleon via Facebook, after researching every sub-Saharan 
player in Egypt using Wikipedia and Soccerway.com.  Although the majority of the 
players were untraceable on Facebook, some had what Facebook calls a “Fan Page.”  
Supposedly created by the fans of the players these “fan pages” contain posted videos, 
photos, and articles about each player and allow fans to show forms of support them by 
engaging in conversation and sending words of encouragement.  It was only later that I 
found out that some of these players had actually created the pages themselves.   
Even though Facebook markets itself as a social networking platform before my 
thesis reseach I had never utilized it to make social contact with strangers. I had only 
befriended and engaged with people that I had already known. I started by Facebook 
search for informants by sending short messages asking if the football players were 
interested in being interviewed.  Most agreed and then added me as a friend on Facebook.  
I accepted their friendship hesitantly, unsure whether it would have negative 
consequences.  Some I did not add immediately because I consciously tried to delay it as 
long as possible until I actually met them.  It was not long after I started to friend players 
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on Facebook that their other football-playing friends would add me without even 
knowing me at all.  Some of these friends would later become my informants as well, 
creating an almost virtual snowballing effect. In the end, I was in contact with enough 
players to field a team on the field and have a couple waiting on the bench.   
The Egyptian law limits the number of foreign players per team to only three.  
Ghanaians and Nigerians make up the majority of the African football player population 
in the country, which is also representative in my sample.  In the table below, players are 
divided by their nationality.  They are grouped together based on the specific process 
through which they came to Egypt: whether they were club-recruited, agent-assisted or if 
they were “independent”, meaning they came without an accompanying agent or team 
recruiter.  These terms are further developed as a typology in chapter two. 
Though Facebook aided my ability to establish contacts in this industry, I believe 
that it also hurt my chances of constructing a relatively serious and professional 
                                                3 The player’s nationality is withheld to protect his identity.  
 Club-Recruited Agent-Assisted Independent players 
 
Ghana 2 3  
Nigeria 1 2 2 
Guinea   1 
Cote d’Ivoire 1   
Country 
withheld3 
 1  
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relationship with some players.  Despite the fact that I had explained to them my 
research, and they understood what I was doing, some players still thought it was 
appropriate to flirt with me.  I was asked out on a couple dates and even received one 
love letter from an informant who had met me only three times.  Some complemented me 
on my pictures tagged on Facebook, which made me feel uncomfortable at times.  
Through the privacy settings that Facebook provided, I eventually limited what players 
could view on my Facebook page.  It was suggested to me later that I should have created 
a “fake” account to be able to network on Facebook, while maintaining my “real” 
account to engage socially with friends.  In hindsight, despite these awkward situations, 
Facebook was the fastest way to contact players and network with athletes.  My research 
would have been harder to complete without it.   
Lastly, what further helped me obtain interviews and befriend the players was my 
nationality.  It was because I am not Egyptian that I was able to meet with many of these 
players.  A Ghanaian player named Castro introduced at the beginning of the chapter told 
me at the start of our interview: “It’s okay. I came because you weren’t Egyptian.”  Many 
players have negative perceptions of Egyptians and Egypt in general.  Being American 
allowed me to gain access to a community, which tends to shelter itself from Egyptians in 
order to perhaps protect its privacy and to limit gossip by football fans, which they claim, 
is a problem. This issue of privacy in the context of surveillance and discipline is 
addressed among many other topics in chapter five. 
Chapter Overviews 
 
In order to answer how African football players negotiate neoliberal hegemonic 
spheres of influence throughout their migration to Egypt and professional careers within, 
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I have divided the thesis into five separate chapters covering the Egyptian football 
industry, migration, and commodification, and subjectification. In chapter one I analyze 
how the economic climate, commercialization, and relatively easy access to Egypt from 
the periphery have allowed Egypt to become a desirable location in which to do business 
as a sports agent and to play as a sub-Saharan football player.   
In chapter two, I introduce each player by creating a typology that serves to 
analyze the context of an African Football player’s migration to Egypt.  This typology is 
used analytically in later chapters as well.  The chapter serves the logistical need to 
introduce all the players mentioned in chapter three without disrupting the flow and 
argument of the later chapter.   
Chapter three and four together argue that the commodification of African 
football players takes place in two contexts: the migration process and investments in 
human capital to create surplus value.  In chapter three I illustrate the ways in which 
these processes of commodification are the products of neoliberal hegemonic spheres of 
influence, which have influenced the football industry globally.  I also argue in chapter 
three that African football labor migration to Egypt is the result of human mediation 
meaning that sports agents and other professionals use their social networks to facilitate 
transnational migration.  The facilitators take advantage of price discrepancies between 
the sending country and Egypt, otherwise known as labor arbitrage as they earn a 
percentage of the contract signed by each player.  This process results in the 
commodification of the football player, which I expand upon in the next chapter.   
In chapter four, I examine the price and values of football players by combining 
two very different theories and perspectives: Gary Becker’s classic economic theory of 
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human capital and Karl Marx’s radical economic theory about labor and commodities.  
These theories are applied to the present neoliberal global context. The chapter argues 
that the investment in human capital by clubs and sports agents is inherent in the process 
of commodification of football players as the means to creating surplus value through the 
trade and loaning of players on the global and Egyptian national labor exchange market.  
 Finally in chapter five, I shift from the perspective of the football industry and its 
commodification to that of players’ subjectification in Egypt.  I employ Foucault’s (1994) 
theory of objectification in order to analyze the creation of the subject through 
disciplinary practices.  My goal is to demonstrate that even though the relationship 
between the employee and the employer has been casualized due to neoliberal 
deregulations, the club still perceives these players as objects and commodities. 
These five chapters work together to conclude that neoliberalization has changed 
the way in which football labor moves, develops, and lives.  Football players’ bodies are 
worked upon, shaped, and manipulated by other humans to form a certain product that 
has a use-value for the club itself, an exchange-value should the club decide to sell the 
player, and price, which is determined through negotiations with the club.  The body of 
the player is subjected to hegemonic disciplinary spheres of influence which shape the 
body to be younger, to migrate, and regulate the mobility and social interactions of the 
body to increase the use-value and the human capital of the player. 
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1. Why Egypt? A Semi-peripheral Nodal 
Point 
 
Sub-Saharan African football players arrive to a strong and developed football 
and sport culture in Egypt.  Contemporary Egypt has adopted modern sport through the 
social changes created by French and British colonialism.  The development of 
nationalism and socialism under Nasser also stimulated sport activities in Egypt (Sfeir 
1989:185-87).  The British occupation and protectorate from 1882 to 1922, introduced 
football as well as field hockey and cricket to the Egyptian population (Sfeir 1990:190).  
Football out of all the sports has remained popular in Egypt; it has a far reaching hold 
over majority of the population.  Identified by politicians and citizens alike as the 
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national sport, football is the most popular sport in Egypt.  Played by all classes, it 
transcends the economic and cultural divisons in Egypt.  
This chapter discuses not only the popularity of football in Egypt, but more so the 
capitalization of the football industry and how it entices foreigners to migrate to Egypt to 
play football.  The Egyptian Premier Football League is in no way isolated from the 
neoliberalization of European football as discussed in the introduction.  In many ways, 
the Egyptian football league mimics the same contemporary changes in Europe, most 
prominently the commercialization of the sport whereby the league and clubs have 
embraced corporate sponsors.  This embrace was brought about by the decreased funding 
of sports organizations by the Egyptian government, leaving teams and federations little 
choice but to venture into sports marketing (Alafandi and Séguin 2008:1).  The decreased 
funding has affected the football industry, but not as much as other sports in Egypt.  
Many clubs still receive government funding and has stalled privatization of the football 
industry.  Several football clubs have also embraced commercialization, which has 
brought new wealth to the league and some clubs.  There are some clubs that have had 
success in marketing themselves, but generally sports marketing has developed slowly in 
Egypt (Alafandi and Séguin 2008:1).   
As discussed earlier in this introduction, football is on the conscience of many in 
Egypt especially during important national matches.  This has allowed for not only 
economic capitalization, but also political capitalization by political leaders and the 
media.  Together these factors create a better market of sports consumption, which has 
allowed the league to retain top players by being able to provide competitive salaries 
created from this revenue.  This potential revenue is attractive to foreign sports agents 
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and players as well as Egypt’s relative easy access in comparison to Europe, “the core,” 
which is harder to penetrate.  This chapter argues that economic and political 
capitalization, coupled with vibrant football fandom, available capital, and the lowering 
of boundaries between African states, facilitate and encourage football labor migration to 
Egypt. 
A History of Egyptian Football 
 
The British occupation of Egypt began in 1882 (El Sayed 2004:1).  Like 
everywhere else in the British empire, the British brought their armies, their government 
officials, and English sport.  In 1903, the first football club, Al-Sekka Al-Hadid  
(Railway) was formed with British and Italian railway engineers as players.  Though 
football competitions were widespread in Egypt, a fully organized Egyptian League was 
only created with the royal decree of King Farouk in 1948.  Eleven football clubs 
participated in the first season of play, with Al Ahly Sporting Club taking home a thirty 
kilo silver and wood trophy at the conclusion of the season (El Sayed 2004:2).   
Al Ahly Sporting Club was formed in 1907 in Cairo, Egypt.  It had several 
different sports teams.  The Al Ahly football team intially included some European 
players,  but it became exclusively an Egyptian club in 1924 (Alegi 2010:3).  Al Ahly 
also became a venue for colonial resistance; its red uniforms symbolized patriotism 
against British colonial power during the late 1920’s.  It is known among Egyptians as 
just Ahly, which translates into National in English.  Al Ahly remains today the most 
successful football team in Egypt and Africa (Alegi 2010:22). Ahly won the first 
Egyptian League championship in 1948-1949, which was also the first league 
championship to be played in Africa (Alegi 2010:57).  Similar to the rest of North Africa,  
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Egyptian league championships had a competitive and talent imbalance.  The majority of 
the talent was centered in the capital of Cairo.  Al Ahly and their longtime rival, the  
Zamalek Football Club, won all but one of the league titles between 1949 and 1962 
(Alegi 2010: 58).   
The Zamalek Sporting Club was originally founded in 1911 as the Al-Mukhtalat 
Club (El-Sayed 2004:1). Al-Mukhtalat means “mixed” reflecting Zamalek fans whom 
Montague describes as having tended to be a mix of “the British, their allies, and the 
awkward squad: the authors, poets, and intellectuals” (2008:2).  The Zamalek Sporting 
Club was the club of the unpopular King Farouk who the club was originally named for.  
The sporting club’s name was changed to Zamalek following King Farouk’s abdication 
(Montague 2008:2).  Zamalek’s white uniforms were symbols of British colonialism and 
foreigners, which also now coincidently sport  Frito Lays’ Chipsie logo, a foreign 
company (Montague 2008:2).  Ahly, in contrast tended to attract the support of the poor, 
the religious, and nationalists.  These dividing lines of support remain today (Montague 
2008:2).   
Zamalek and Al Ahly have had a longtime local football derby (a sporting contest 
between two cross-town rivals) since Zamalek ended Al Ahly’s decade long run as 
Egyptian league champions in 1960 (FIFA Classic Football 2009:1).  Today, games 
between the two teams result in noticeably less foot and car traffic in and around Cairo.  
This rivalry has sometimes resulted in destruction and death causing the canceling of the 
entire league in the early 1970’s.  The Egyptian government has gone so far as to situate 
the games at neutral venues and to import foreign officals to prevent partiality and claims 
of it (Montague 2008:1).   
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Vibrant Football Fandom 
 
 
“The Egyptians were so happy during these matches [Algeria vs. Egypt] they said 
that is was better to score against Algeria then win the cup. Even if they lose in 
the final they do not care, they are just happy to score against Algeria. It is their 
biggest rival.” –Napoleon, Nigeria 
 
Even as a foreign student, I became caught up in Egypt’s football fever.  I cannot 
help but wonder now why I waved the black, white, and red Egyptian flag while 
balancing myself through the sunroof of my friend’s car as he took the sharp corner off 
the Six of October Bridge in Cairo, Egypt.  Cairo is famous for its over-exhausted 
infrastructure and its heavy and erratic traffic, which filled the streets once again after the 
game ended in the late evening.  I joined others in jubilation after having witnessed 
through the magic of satellite television, Egypt’s triumph and revenge against their 
longtime rival Algeria during the semi- final of the 2010 African Cup of Nations.  They 
would go on to win their third consecutive African Cup of Nations in Angola a couple of 
days later.   
Victory in international competitions can inspire millions of people to celebrate in 
the streets of Alexandria and Cairo.  Egyptians enter the streets on foot, by car, or on 
motorcycles celebrating major national victories such as the 2010 African Nation’s cup 
semi-final against Algeria in Angola.  This game provided even more elation, as it was 
the revenge for Egypt’s loss against Algeria during 2010 World Cup qualifications in 
November 2009 (Gettleman 2009:A6).   
All over Cairo flags were waved and the national anthem was sung. Cairo reached 
frenzy before the match had completely finished. Those on foot blocked and halted 
vehicle traffic by serenading each passing car with a victory dance, as someone would 
 31 
drum songs and beats to keep the crowd rambunctious. Men danced on cars and trucks as 
well in circles with other men.  Men lit on fire the liquid of hair spray cans and others spit 
mouthfuls of gasoline through torches for a larger flame.  Many of those stuck in cars, 
joined the celebrations by beeping horns, waving flags out their windows, propping their 
bodies outside the car windows by sitting on the ledges or popping out of the sunroofs 
like myself.  Children did not have bedtimes; their faces were decorated with black, red, 
and white face paint.  They blew horns and waved flags.  Their fathers and relatives 
placed them on their shoulders, and they joined their families for celebration joy rides 
around the city.  The older children were allowed to dance on top of the car roof when 
they were not moving.  Women joined their compatriots by car and in limited quantities 
on the street dancing in the neighborhoods of Cairo.  In downtown Tahrir Square, young 
Egyptians filled the square dancing, yelling in celebration and causing the local 
policemen to panic, as they hopelessly tried to control the crowd’s movement and 
enthusiasm.  The fans slowly made their way to the bridges over the Nile, where they 
continued to hold up traffic to the early hours of the morning.  For days after, people 
continued to beep their car horns in the same repetitive rhythm at random times to 
continue the celebration.  That night, I had taken it upon myself to wear red and not 
resemble an Algerian supporter; however no Algerian would even have thought of 
leaving his or her apartment that evening, after having witnessed extreme backlash 
against Algeria during the World Cup Qualifiers in November 2009 where Algeria had 
triumphed over the Egyptian Pharaohs4. 
                                                4 Egyptian Pharaohs is the colloquial nickname for the Egyptian National team. 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After leaving one of the many over-crowded cafés, my friends and I joined the 
celebrations on the street.  My Egyptian friends felt the need to express the excitement 
with a drive around the city.  With three of us sitting in the back seats and three in the 
front, we took off to connect with rest of the city’s excitement while listening to loud 
house and hip-hop music.  We were fortunate to have access to an Egyptian flag, though 
my friend felt it was not enough and she tried to grab someone else’s flag from the street.  
Unfortunately, I sat in the middle back seat unable to fully experience and react 
sufficiently to those who were celebrating on the street.  After those sitting in the front 
were tired of waving the flag, they handed it to me; I then popped through the sunroof 
giving me the full view of the madness on the streets. Despite it being after midnight, 
traffic had come to a near standstill on the Corniche, the street that runs along the Nile 
river, as Egyptians crowded the streets on foot and by car in celebration.  The traffic 
resembled heavy congestion more typical of late afternoons in Cairo. 
What my observations demonstrate is that football fandom is a public event in 
Egypt.  Celebration takes place in public spaces with large numbers of people outside the 
stadium.  It is a social gathering that includes rituals of song and melody such as cars 
horns and drumming.  It is a large social interaction that takes place in cars, on the street 
and in parks.  These public celebrations were possibly the sole large public gathering 
permitted by Hosni Mubark’s regime.  His regime capitalized on this vibrant fandom and 
encouraged it with the exception of Egyptian Ultras Fan groups.  The Egyptian football 
industry is able to harness large amounts of available capital through commercialization 
and sports marketing practices from the vibrant fan base that creates a large number 
consumers as explained later in this chapter. 
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Capitalizing Politically on Egyptian National Conscience 
5 
  
 In the previous section, I demonstrated that Egyptian football fandom centers 
upon public gatherings.  The mass appreciation and support of football in Egypt not only 
results in interesting rituals, but is also manipulated politically by the government, 
journalists, and even former President Mubarak himself.  Football has successfully been a 
part of Egyptian national consciousness since the 1920’s and has mediated conversations 
about race, civilization, and modernity (Lopez 2009:41).  Football victories create 
enormous nationalist speech within published literature and media.  When Egypt won the 
Africa Cup of Nations in 2008, Al-Ahram Weekly wrote: 
They said it could not be done—an off-white country capturing the Africa Cup of 
nations (ACN) in darkest West Africa, home to the continent’s mightiest teams. 
And indeed, despite being defending champions, Egypt was some way down the 
list of pre-tournament favorites, an afterthought kept in the shadows by the likes 
of Ghana, Ivory Coast and Cameroon, (2008:14). 
 
Egypt acknowledged its position as an intermediary station in a “development 
circuit” during their bid to host the 2010 World Cup.  The bidding committee presented 
                                                
5 Figure 1. Comic Strip by Tarek Shahin 
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Egypt as an African nation where other Africans came to practice in a “more modern 
locale in which to improve not only their skills, but also their ability to cope with the 
challenges of modern football playing nations” (Lopez, 2008:283).  Unfortunately for 
Egypt, FIFA awarded the right to host the 2010 World Cup to South Africa.  After 
FIFA’s announcement, Karim Hafez on Egyptian delegation’s website analyzed why 
Egypt lost the race to host the World Cup.  His questions went beyond football.  He 
created allegories comparing Egypt’s defeat as a reflection of Egypt’s social, political, 
and cultural failures.  He questioned why Egypt’s delegation could only produce one 
internationally known celebrity, Omar Sherif, while South Africa had six including 
Nelson Mandela, Charlize Theron, and Desmond Tutu.  Football became an allegory for 
Egypt’s failures internationally and domestically  (Lopez 2009:300).  
Although FIFA did not award Egypt with the honor of hosting the FIFA world 
cup, Egypt hosted the under twenty FIFA World Cup in the fall of 2009.  It was the 
subsequent World Cup qualifiers after this competition against Algeria that electrified the 
country in nationalist sentiment.  The media, politicians, and the Egyptian government 
capitalized on this moment to take advantage of the population’s distraction from 
domestic issues. 
The Egyptian-Algerian rivalry surrounding the 2010 World Cup qualification was 
modern day dramatic spectacle in its creation in the media.  In 2009 Algeria and Egypt 
played three qualifying matches against each other.  The first game was held in Algiers, 
where Egyptians charged Algerian supporters with purposely causing extensive noise 
pollution.  This prevented Egyptian players from properly sleeping the night before their 
game causing Egypt to lose the match in Algeria (Racelma 2009:1).  Their next match 
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was played in Cairo.  The Algerian team claimed to have been pelted by rocks as their 
bus made their way from Cairo International Airport to their hotel.  Several players were 
injured from the rocks and shattered glass that spilled into their bus.  Egyptians mocked 
the injured Algerian players during the second match, which ended in a tie that secured a 
third game on neutral territory in Khartoum, Sudan.  The Egyptian media claimed that 
Algeria had staged an elaborate hoax and that the bus was never attacked (Aiba 2009:1). 
Algeria’s claim has been taken seriously by FIFA because of video evidence provided by 
the team themselves.  For not protecting the Algerian team when they were in Cairo, 
FIFA has penalized Egypt by charging them a fine of 70,000 Euros and stipulating that 
Egypt’s first two home matches of 2014 World Cup qualifiers take place at least a 
hundred kilometers away from Cairo (Sadek 2010:1).  About a year and a half later, a 
friend who has acquaintances with one of several Ultras fan groups divulged to me that 
one of the groups planned and orchestrated the attack on the bus. 
The third match played on November 18th, 2009, resulted in a loss for Egypt that 
disqualified them from the World Cup finals in South Africa.  Egyptians did not react 
calmly to this loss.  The country became angry during the days after the match.  The 
Egyptian government, Egyptian press, and media made several claims that infuriated the 
Egyptian population against Algeria.  An Egyptian sports agent, Ehab told me that after 
attending the match in Khartoum, his bus was attacked by fans.  Aligning with the 
Egyptian media, he also told me that the Algerian government sent planes full of prison 
convicts that were told to attack Egyptian fans.  What is interesting about Ehab is that he 
is very well educated, but still believed everything the media and government had hyped.  
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The foreign press reported that the Egyptian government was using this moment to 
distract citizens from the real problems Egypt faces. 
Fueled by their government, the Mubarak family, and media reports after the 
game in November 2009, Egyptians marched in protest of Algeria into the upper class 
island neighborhood of Zamalek.  The crowd halted traffic around the city for several 
long hours, as they sought access to the Algerian Embassy in the middle of a normally 
relatively calm neighborhood.  The protests turned violent on 26 of July Street, where 
protesters threw rocks at windows of multiple businesses destroying property and making 
a complete mess of the area.  The crowd grew and made noise till early morning.  The 
protests disrupted already overcrowded traffic flows across the city.  The immediate 
vicinity of the Algerian Embassy was blocked from car traffic, to keep potential 
protesters away from the Algerian Embassy.  The streets that provided access to the 
embassy gave the impression that Egypt was preparing for war.  Several dozen green-
boxed trucks lined the streets filled with Egyptian riot police waiting to stop any potential 
violence that might arise.  The Algerian Embassy continued to receive extra security from 
Egyptian police forces several weeks after the riots.  
 As demonstrated in the previous section and this current section, football is on the 
Egyptian national conscience.  Football has a widespread fan base that reacts emotionally 
to competition results.  During Mubarak’s regime, football was manipulated politically to 
create the sense of an imagined community and to evoke nationalist pride to distract the 
citizens from important domestic issues.  This large amount of fandom facilitates sports 
marketing and commercialization ventures that do not need to educate their market.  
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The Organization of Egyptian Football Leagues 
 
The Egyptian Football League system is multi-tiered with one premier league and 
several lower tiers or levels competing to move up in ranking.  All levels employ African 
football labor, but not all teams choose to employ foreign labor.  There are currently 
multiple nationalities playing in Egypt.  The labor comes from beyond Africa including 
Brazil, Turkey, and other Middle Eastern countries.  By law, each football team is only 
allowed to employ three foreigners per squad.  Palestinians are counted as local players.  
This policy is fairly conservative in comparison to Europe, such as England, which 
maintains no foreign player quotas.  Sixteen teams compete in what is currently known as 
the Etisalat Egyptian Premier League, which is named after its sponsoring 
telecommunications corporation.  Below the premier league sits the second division 
teams, which are divided into three groups and are translated into English as A, B, and C.  
Each group maintains sixteen teams.  Together there are sixty-four teams within the 
Egyptian Football Leagues, all of which are subject to promotion and relegation6 
determined by their overall season results.   
An English woman who worked in the refugee services community once told me 
that she “would be able to field several teams worth of Africans for the number of times I 
was told by someone that they were in Cairo to play football.”  The population of African 
amateur football players in Cairo is very large.  They come from many walks of life and 
                                                6 Promotion and relegation are the processes by which teams are transferred between divisions and in the 
case of Egypt second division groups based on their season’s standings.  The top two teams are promoted 
while the lower two teams are relegated to a lower division.  
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many countries.  The lucky ones find contracts at football clubs, yet many struggle to 
survive in Egypt.   
 Not every team fills its foreign player quota.  At three foreigners per team, there 
are legally 192 potential spots for foreign players in Egypt on 64 teams with in the 
Premier League and lower divisions.  At the beginning of September 2010, forty-four of 
the potential forty-eight spots in the Egyptian Premier League were filled by foreign 
players.  Of those forty-four, other Arabs from Iraq, Algeria, Lebanon, Syria, Libya, and 
Morocco filled six of those positions.  The remainder was from Sub-Saharan Africa; 
Ghanaians dominated this group comprising 36% of the population with fourteen 
individuals.  Nigerians had the second largest foreign population with a total of 6 players 
in the Egyptian Premier League. 
Commercialization and Capital in the Egyptian Football Industry 
 
Egypt has not been immune to these trends such as global commercialization and 
neoliberalization of football as described previously in the chapter.  Egyptian sports 
organizations, such as the Egyptian Sports Council and the Egyptian Football Federation, 
have been traditionally funded and supported by the Egyptian state and not the private 
sector (Mohammed and Ibrahim 2006b).  In recent years, this has changed and available 
government funding has been cut dramatically (Alafandi and Seguin 2008:1).  Alafandi 
and Seguin theorized that cuts in sports funding were the result of economic downturn.  
The prominence of neoliberal budget cuts and the International Monetary Fund’s 
restructuring program during the 1990s in Egypt is most likely a more specific 
explanation as to why the government reduced their spending on sport.  Yet there remain 
exceptions to this even in the Egyptian Premier League.  
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 In regards to football, Mubarak’s regime has continued monetary funding as a 
means to perpetuate propaganda and as some Egyptians believe in order to distract the 
population from domestic issues.  Egyptian Ministries and state-owned companies own 
the majority of Egyptian football clubs (Dorsey 2011d:1).  Half of the clubs in the 
Egyptian Premier League are state-owned (Dorsey 2011e:1).  Since the revolution, 
charges of corruption have been made against Mubarak’s petroleum Minister Sameh 
Fahmy, who gave generous handouts to football clubs owned by the ministry, including 
Eneppi and Petrojet, and he further funded Division two teams, Gasco and Petrol Asyut 
(Dorsey 2011f:1).  FIFA has insisted that state involvement in Egyptian football clubs be 
reduced and that these clubs become privately owned (Dorsey 2011e:1).   
Previous marketing literature has discussed sports marketing in Egypt as a 
reflection of commercial trends globally (see Mohammed and Ibrahim 2006a).  What is 
striking about the Egyptian sport is that some marketing trends seen in many parts of the 
world have not appeared in Egypt, particularly sports marketing towards the female 
population.  Present Egyptian commercialization discourse is only concerned with 
marketing matches as well as selling broadcasting rights and commercials in the form of 
billboards in stadiums and team sponsorship (Mohammed and Ibrahim 2006a:115).  
There is also a lack of market research that would encourage sports federations to take 
advantage of marketing opportunities (Mohammed and Ibrahim 2006b); however, 
currently there are laws in Egypt that restrict commercial activities of football clubs.  The 
2011 revolution put on hold a drafted law that would permit non-profit football clubs to 
merchandise their brand by creating commercial companies (Dorsey 2011f:2).  There are 
only two “commercially run” Premier League teams in Egypt (Dorsey 2011f:3).  Despite 
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a lack of large amounts of sports marketing, marketing techniques that are perhaps the 
most profitable have been embraced by the Egyptian football industry.  As previously 
stated Egyptian Premier League’s main sponsor is Etisalat, a United Arab Emirates 
telecommunications company, which has a mobile network in Egypt.  Many teams have 
corporate sponsors beyond just sporting companies.  For instance, Ahly’s jersey sports 
the German Telecommunications Company and Egyptian mobile service provider 
Vodafone’s logo.  
This amount of commercialization coupled with a larger economy and available 
capital allow for sports agents and football players to benefit more from contracts in 
Egypt than at home.  There are larger amounts of available capital in Egypt than in most 
other countries in Africa, thus facilitating migration by having a more profitable market.  
Egypt football leagues also benefit from the wealth of country.  The GDP per capita in 
Egypt is $6,200, which significantly larger than most countries in Africa with exception 
of Tunisia, Morocco, and South Africa.  Egypt’s population of 82 million makes it a 
much larger market in comparison to most other countries in Africa, while also having a 
sizable upper and middle class.  To compare, Egypt has more than double the annual 
GDP per capita than the countries with the two largest populations of foreign players in 
the Egyptian Premier League.  Ghana and Nigeria have a GDP per capita of $1,600 and  
$2,400, respectively.  In terms of Egypt’s GDP (purchasing power parity), Egypt is the 
richest nation in Africa.  The financial successes of some clubs have created exorbitant 
differences between the average income in Egypt and football stars in Egypt.  Ismaily star 
Hosni Abd-Robou earns five million Egyptian pounds annually (around 850,000 U.S. 
Dollars), while about half the country lives on about two dollars a day (Maher 2011:1). 
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 Since the 2011 Egyptian Revolution, the football industry has gone through 
upheavals and restructurings in order to deal with the economic consequences of the 
Egyptian League’s postponement.  The Egyptian Football Association has proposed 
salary and transfer fee caps in order to deal with the football club’s financial issues 
resulting from a lack of generated income due to competition delays on account of the 
Egyptian revolution (Dorsey 2011e:1).  Dorsey, who is observing the Egyptian Football 
League, has remarked that the revolution will change football in Egypt over the long term 
(see Dorsey 2011e:1; Dorsey 2011d:1).  
Lowering of Boundaries 
 
Within the capitalist world system, Egypt is more developed than most other 
African countries, but not as developed as the core, which includes the United States and 
Europe.  There is debate about the position of Egypt within dependency theory.  
Wallerstein (1997) believes Egypt lies in the semi-periphery while Chase-Dunn, Kawano, 
and Brewer (2000) see Egypt as belonging in the periphery.  When applying world 
systems theory to the football industry, the capitalization of football industry in Egypt 
situates it as semi-peripheral country within this network that feeds Europe.  Egypt’s 
leagues are far more developed than the periphery, yet less so than the core.  Because 
Egypt lies outside the core, it is more accessible to the periphery.  
The core of the football industry, Western Europe, is hard to penetrate and hinders 
football labor migration.  By contrast, outside in the periphery, movement is far easier.  
Egypt has much more relaxed visa regulations than European states.  Players of many 
nationalities are simply required to buy a fifteen-dollar visa at the airport upon arrival in 
Egypt.  There are no visa interviews, no verification of employment, or attestations of 
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financial stability.  Geographically, Egypt has fewer boundaries for other Africans and it 
is more easily accessible than Europe.  This openness facilitates African football labor 
migration to Egypt.  The accessibility does not translate to viewing Egypt as a viable 
alternative to Europe, but as stepping-stone to Europe. 
Conclusion 
 
Egypt has become a nodal point within football labor migration because it has 
liberal visa regulations that create lower barriers to entry into the country, vibrant football 
fandom, commercialization of the football industry, and sizable amounts of capital within 
the league and its fan base.  This makes Egypt an appealing location for sports agents to 
do business and facilitate migration of foreign players.   The Egyptian Premier League 
provides salaries that entice their own Egyptian players to remain in Egypt instead of 
migrating to Europe.  This allows the league to remain competitive because a “muscle 
drain” affects Egypt less than other African countries.  The competitive league is enticing 
to foreign players looking to improve their skills and CV to enable them to eventually 
play in Europe.  These factors influence Sub-Saharan African players to perceive Egypt 
as a nodal point or stepping-stone between the periphery and the core.  For these African 
players, Egypt is not as desirable of a location as Europe, but it is better than home with 
greater available resources for them to improve their profile in order to eventually sign a 
contract with a European club.  In order to arrive at this temporary stopover, multiple 
actors enable player movement.  The context of these migrations of sub-Saharan African 
players is organized as a typology in the next chapter, which also serves as an 
introduction to the players I interviewed.   
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2. A Typology of African Football Players 
in Egypt 
 
Sub-Saharan African football players migrate to Egypt because of Egypt’s 
position in the semi-periphery and football industry, which provides an attractive location 
to play professionally.  Specifically, the Egyptian football industry has large amounts of 
available capital financed by commercialization and government funding that enables 
African players to obtain higher salaries than available in their home countries.   The 
preferable financial condition within the Egyptian football industry translates into better 
football infrastructure and coaching staff, thus increasing the human capital of the 
football players.   These benefits create an attractive stopover in one’s professional 
football career that sub-Saharan African football players hope will lead them to Europe.   
Despite the common goals and attraction to Egypt, the players in my sample have varying 
paths that brought them to Egypt.  They have experienced different levels of monetary 
and professional success in Egypt and elsewhere.  They are not a homogeneous group, 
but a group of people who have experienced many of the same hegemonic processes to 
varying extents.  This chapter seeks to introduce the players in an organized fashion and 
provide a preface to chapter three.  By introducing them in a separate chapter, chapter 
three is able to focus on theorizing human mediation within football labor migration 
without interruption.  This is typology is also used analytically in later chapters.  The 
players are divided into three sub-groups based on the circumstances of their migration to 
Egypt that include independent, agent-assisted, and club-recruited. 
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 The first sub-group of players are those who do not fit previous explanations of 
football labor migration (see: Lanfranchi and Taylor 2001:186; Darby, and all 2007:143; 
Poli 2008:2).  They are self-motivated, self-funded, and independent of an agent or club 
recruiter when they migrate to Egypt.  This does not mean that they are free from 
influence from those within the football industry, but at the moment of migration, they 
have no contractual obligations to a football agent or anyone in the football industry.  I 
refer to them as independent players. 
 The second sub-group of football players is made up of those who came to Egypt 
accompanied by an agent.  A player travels to Egypt where his agent will arrange try-outs 
with various clubs.  Some succeed and some do not.  It is most important to understand 
that the agent is an integral part of these players’ migration process.  The agents initiate 
the interest to travel and work in Egypt.  Some agents provide airfare and some do not.  
Agents often abandon players who do not obtain contracts.  I refer to these players as 
agent-assisted.  
 Lastly, the third sub-group contains players that have traveled to Egypt at the 
invitation of a football club in Egypt.  The club, rather than the agent, is the initiator of 
the migration.  This is not to say that an agent neither accompanies nor is responsible for 
the networking to create this opportunity.  It is important to understand the clubs’ 
invitation is vital to the migration process within this particular sub-group’s experience, 
which I refer to as club-recruited players. 
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Independent Players 
 
Thomas, Nigeria 
Thomas is an uncontracted player from Nigeria whom I met through my work with 
refugees.  He migrated to Egypt by himself without the guidance of an agent, as he 
explains: “I have been here since December 2007.  I worked before in Nigeria and saved 
my money so I could sponsor myself to come to Egypt.”  When I first interviewed him, 
he was earning money teaching Sudanese refugees, while trying to find a contract and an 
agent.  He spent most of his time practicing with Nigerians and participating in exhibition 
matches in order to showcase his skills.  Six months after I initially interviewed Thomas, 
he obtained a contract with a small second division group C team that paid him 200 U.S 
dollars a month as salary. 
Aquib, Nigeria 
Aquib is an uncontracted player who has lived in Cairo since November 2008.  The 
number of other independent players in his situation “is uncountable as there are so many 
in Egypt,” he explained to me.  He uses his university degree to teach science in order to 
support himself.  He was paying 200 Egyptian pounds a month to attend an Egyptian 
Football Academy in Giza, a suburb of Cairo, that he says is owned by the Premier 
League Club, Al Zamalek.  They train him and help him stay in shape.  He has become 
an irregular migrant in Egypt because his visa has expired.  He originally migrated to 
Egypt through the influence of other players, agents, and members of the football 
industry, who told him that Egypt had good contracts available.  He sponsored himself to 
come to Egypt and traveled by himself.  He struggles to find an agent to represent him, 
despite FIFA’s website listing the official agents in Egypt.  He believes that the lack of an 
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agent hinders his progression in his career, but also feels Egypt does not offer the 
opportunities that were advertised to him before leaving Nigeria. 
Zinedine, Guinea, 25 years old (football age, 18)  
I first met Zinedine over sodas at an Ahwa (shisha/coffee shop) in downtown Cairo.  My 
Guinean colleague randomly met him on the street in Maadi and gave me his contact 
information.  Problems regarding his family’s debt caused him to leave Guinea; however, 
he also believed that he had to leave for Northern Africa in order to further his career: 
No… There is no one who told me [to come to Egypt].  Me, I should even come 
to the Maghreb, that means Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia.  If I should leave, it for to 
go to Europe, or the United States, or Canada or something like that. But it is 
because my parents are in debt.  They paid money to leave [Guinea].  They have 
some debt.  They have a little credit.  I left.  After, I had some problems there.  I 
am not able to return to Guinea because my parents have some problems.  When I 
return, it was not good.7 
Zinedine paid for the cost of moving to Egypt.  He successfully obtained a contact with a 
football club through the help of an Egyptian agent, but the club failed on their 
obligations and did not pay him his monthly salary of 500 Egyptian Pounds.  He left the 
club with the encouragement of his agent.  As of September 2010, he had obtained 
another contract with a second division team.   
Agent-Assisted Players 
 
Henry, Ghana, 21 Years old 
I met Henry after he attended church in Victoria Square in the Cairo Suburb of Maadi on 
a Friday afternoon.  On his way from church to meet me, policemen, who were fans, 
                                                
7 Original quote in French: Non…il y a pas quelqu’un qui m’a dit [venir en Egypte].   Moi, je devrait même 
pas venir la Maghreb ça te dit l‘Égypte, la Maroc,  la Tunisie.  Si je devrais sortir c’est pour partir en 
Europe ou aux Etats-Unis ou le Canada ou quelque chose comme ça.  Mais c’est parce que mes parents ont 
endettés.  Ils ont payé d’argent pour sortir.  Ils ont peu de dette.  Ils ont peu de crédit. Je suis sorti.   Après 
j’ai eu des problèmes là bas.  Je pouvais pas me retourner en Guinea parce que mes parents ont des 
problèmes.   Quand je me retourne C’était pas bon.   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stopped him so they could be photographed with Henry and “kiss” him.  Henry came to 
Egypt because of the encouragement of his Ghanaian agent who traveled often between 
Egypt and Ghana.  He stated: “The agent encouraged me.  The situation there is self-
encouraging. You want a better life.  I paid for everything on my own, but then the club 
[Egyptian Club] refunded me after I did the tryout and I signed a contract with them.”  
Henry came without the guarantee of a contract and invested his own money to further 
his career.  He was one of the lucky ones who were able to obtain a contact very easily 
and was actually reimbursed his investment by his new Egyptian club.  
Fred, Ghana, 23 years old  
I met Fred, the day before he left for Ghana during the league’s summer break.  I met him 
at a café in the Cairo suburb of Maadi where he was staying with his friend Ricky, whom 
I also interviewed.   Fred came to Egypt on the expense of his Ghanaian agent.  He tried 
out with an Egyptian club who offered him a contract.  He currently plays in Alexandria.   
He migrated to Egypt to further his career with the ultimate goal of playing in Europe.  
Besides football, he hopes to eventually to complete a master’s degree in Europe, as it 
will help obtain employment back home in Ghana after he finishes his football career.  
Ricky, Ghana, 23 years old (football age, 21) 
I met Ricky when he accompanied his friend Fred to an interview that I had arranged.  
Ricky was living in New Maadi in an apartment provided by his team.  He came to Egypt 
through a French agent who he described as taking his money and running away.  Ricky 
paid for his ticket because his agent did not know his skill. He explained: “because if the 
agent manger knows your skill, they will pay for you; if they do not, they will have you 
pay, and possibly reimburse you.”  He feels he was completely misled by his agent who 
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brought him to Egypt and then when he initially did not obtain a contract, the agent fled 
leaving Ricky behind in Cairo to fend for himself.  He was able to obtain a contract with 
the second tier team on his own through contacts he had made before his agent left.  
Ricky’s contract was almost finished by the time I met him and he had no opportunities 
coming his way.  His past experience with his former French agent has made him 
reluctant to try to obtain a new agent.  
 
Martin, Ghana, 27 years old (football age 21) 
I met Martin with his friend Castro at Johnny Rockets at City Stars Mall, an elite 
mall with many western brands that borders the Cairo neighborhoods of Nasr City and 
Heliopolis.  Martin came to Egypt through his Egyptian agent who traveled often to 
Ghana.  Martin’s agent arranged and paid for Martin’s transportation costs.  He also 
asked several of his brothers and friends about Egypt to figure out if it was worth 
migrating to Egypt to play football.  He decided to come to Egypt to complete several 
try-outs and eventually obtained a contract.  Martin explained to me that without his 
agent, he would have been unable to obtain the contract because a recommendation, as in 
other forms of employment, is key to getting noticed and legitimized.  Skills alone will 
not enable you move forward in your career.  He hopes to have a future career working as 
a talent scout within the global football industry. 
Maleek, from Nigeria 
I interviewed Maleek who accompanied his friend Paul to an interview.  He came to 
Egypt through the help of his Nigerian agent who had contacts in Egypt, and successfully 
tried out with his current team.  He lives outside the neighbourhood where he plays in 
order to have more “freedom” because Egyptians tend to “talk.” 
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Club-Recruited Players 
 
Charles, Nigeria, 23 years old  
Charles has been in Egypt since 2006.  He did not choose Egypt, it just so happened that 
another team recruited him through his agent’s networking.  He stated: “I did not choose 
Egypt, it just came my way.  My agent was able to obtain me an offer…I was playing in 
Nigeria.  I have an agent and he was working with one of his friends here in Egypt.  I had 
a contract with my club in Nigeria and the club in Egypt paid to change the contract.”  
Charles is a common example of the football player exchange and loan market, which 
routinely commodifies football players by negotiating transfers fees that the recruiting or 
new club pays the player’s home club to cancel the contract to obtain contract rights to 
the player.  It is the network of his agent that greatly expanded his opportunities for 
exposure and contracts abroad.  
Napoleon, Ghana 
Napoleon is one of the few African players I have met in Cairo who plays defense.  He 
has been in Egypt for nearly six years and has learned to speak Arabic.  He came to 
Egypt because an agent scouted him for a team in Egypt.  He did not seek to migrate to 
Egypt.  The Egyptian club liked his CV and was able to negotiate a contract, as he 
explains:  
The club there [in Egypt] was looking for someone with my skills.  One agency 
looked at my profile online.  They came to Ghana to watch our match.  So they 
sent my CV to the club, I never knew there was a club here [in Egypt]. They liked 
my CV and so they requested for my services.  They were able to pay the money, 
the transfer fee that my club in Ghana wanted. So they [Egyptian club] asked me 
if I wanted to go and I said no problem, I wanted to get a new life. 
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Napoleon is an example of commodification through the football labor exchange market.  
The Egyptian club in order to release Napoleon from his current contract had to pay the 
Ghanaian club a transaction fee of a negotiated value.   
Castro, Ghana, 23 years old  
I met Castro with his friend Martin who was introduced earlier in City Stars Mall near 
H&M.  We met there because Castro lived by City Stars.  He told me that he visits the 
mall often, which demonstrates a certain form of monetary success in Egypt because City 
Stars Mall is a more of an upper class locale with expensive western brands and foreign 
restaurant chains.  They suggested we go to the American chain restaurant, Johnny 
Rockets, as it was less busy than other cafes.  Castro explained to me for over an hour his 
experiences coming to Egypt and his life in Cairo.  A Ghanaian agent with whom he had 
met several times was able to obtain him a contract in Egypt.  He asked Castro if he was 
interested in playing for Egyptian team who was interested in him.  Castro explained that 
he made the decision carefully, obtaining references from other players in Egypt to 
legitimize the club and the league.   
Mouctar, Cote D’Ivoire  
 
I met Mouctar in an Egyptian Café chain, Cilantro during the last evening of Ramadan 
during Iftar dinner before Eid in 2010.  His friend who plays in Kuwait and his team 
translator accompanied him to the interview.  The first thing I noticed about Mouctar was 
not his height or his clothes, but the iphone 4 he was holding in his hand, and I 
automatically thought he must be successful.  As I went over his history, it was obvious 
that Mouctar has had a transnational career that has allowed him to work in multiple 
countries.  Mouctar has had far more experience playing abroad than any other African 
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players I had met.  He had played in another North African state and in one of the Gulf 
States before obtaining a contract with an Egyptian Premier League team.  He secured his 
first contract abroad through the help of an agent; but an Egyptian team scouted and 
recruited him during a tournament in one of the Gulf States.  His goal in Egypt is to win 
the national cup and he would like to play in Europe after his contract with his Egyptian 
team expires. 
Paul, Africa (country not designated to protect identity) 
I met Paul at Costa Café in Nasr City with his friend Maleek from Nigeria.  Paul 
represented his national team during a match in Egypt against the Egyptian national team.  
Instead of returning home after the match, Paul remained in Egypt as several teams had 
scouted him during the game.  He remained to complete try-outs and was eventually 
offered a contract.  He lives with his teammates in an apartment provided by his team. 
Conclusion 
  
 Football players migrate to Egypt under one of three circumstances; 
independently, as agent-assisted players, or as club-recruited players.  These 
circumstances affect the way in which players experience the migration process.  They 
present their own challenges and potential hurdles such as locating an agent, completing 
try-outs, abandonment by agents, paying for airfare, age falsification, and negotiating 
contracts.  The migration process is discussed in the following chapter. 
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3. Departing Home: Agent Induced 
Movement 
 
Football in Ghana and Egypt are different. There is a lot of money in football, 
and in Ghana everyone wants to travel so they can make it in life. – Fred, Ghana 
 
Football labor migration between countries and continents has a long and 
complicated history.  Anthropologists agree that contemporary football labor migration is 
a consequence of current economic and political relations within football globally (Taylor 
2006:8; see also: Lanfranchi and Taylor 2001:186; Darby et al. 2007:143).  Current 
football labor migration scholarship is guided by the understanding that migration flows 
to the North in Eurocentric neo-colonial patterns (see: Lanfranchi and Taylor 2001:186; 
Darby and all 2007:143; Poli 2008:2).  These expanding migration flows lead to a 
“muscle drain” and poor development of football clubs and leagues in emigration 
countries (Poli, 2008:5).  Most previous literature focuses on football labor migration to 
Europe (see Darby et al. 2007; Lanfranchi and Taylor 2001; Magee and Sugden 
2002;Taylor 2006).  As such while this literature relates to core-periphery relations, other 
scholars have started to examine semi-periphery and periphery relations. 
Previous research on migration to non-European countries includes inter-African 
football labor migration to South Africa (Cornelissen and Solberg 2007) and Asian 
football labor migration to South America (see Taylor 2006).  Over the last decade, South 
Africa has started to emerge as an “intermediary… drawing talent from an African 
‘hinterland,’ and providing a, mostly temporary, station to players who seek to gain from 
its relatively advanced training infrastructure” (Cornelissen and Solberg, 2007:308).  The 
idea of “intermediary” that Cornelissen and Solberg propose is important to this research 
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in terms of understanding Egypt’s role within the greater global political economy of the 
football industry and the motivations behind sub-Saharan football players working in 
Egypt.  Unlike South Africa, where foreign African football labor developed after 
political changes in the 1990’s, Egypt has been importing football labor since the 1980s.  
One of the earliest sub-Saharan African footballers to play in Egypt was Cameroonian 
goaltender Joseph-Antoine Bell; he spent several years playing for the Arab Contractors 
in Cairo during the 1980s (National Football Teams 2010:1).  Egypt is a nodal point that 
connects not only Africa and Europe, but also Africa and the Middle East. 
 African football labor migration to Egypt cannot be understood through neo-
colonial networks that use former economic and social colonial connections to create 
fluid flows of labor in south to north transactions, which are used to describe African 
migration to Europe (see: Lanfranchi and Taylor 2001:186; Darby and all 2007:143; Poli 
2008:2).  Egypt represents a different form of northern migration.  Egypt’s only colonial 
venture began in 1820 when Wali Muhammad Ali Pasha invaded Northern Sudan 
(Collins 2008:10).  After a series of failed Mahdist revolts in Sudan and a short-lived 
withdrawal of Egyptian and British troops from Sudan, Anglo-Egyptian Sudan was 
established through in January 1899 through a condominium, or a joint ruling partnership 
(Collins 2008:33).  Sudan achieved independence from Egypt and Great Britain in 1956 
(Collins 2008:69).  The relationship between Egypt and Sudan remains strong today, 
however the migration that occurs between the two countries is mainly asylum seekers 
from Darfur.  The remainder of Africa does not have any former colonial ties with Egypt 
except for a brief partial invasion of Ethiopia.  Yet, Egypt is a former French and British 
colony and thus Egypt shares a colonial history with the rest of Africa.  There are other 
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connections developed by sports agents that have facilitated African football labor 
migration to Egypt.  As described in chapter one, what enables Egypt to be a worthwhile 
economic investment for football agents and an appealing environment for African 
football players is its more developed profitable football industry, coupled with Egypt’s 
larger economy and lowered boundaries that provide easier access. 
 These lowered boundaries are representative of the easier mobility within the 
periphery and the neoliberal loosening of restrictions by institutions, such as FIFA and 
other local actors.  The deregulation is dependent upon local actors that implement 
neoliberal policies and ideologies resulting in unique local mutations.  Local independent 
actors enable sub-Saharan football labor migration to Egypt.  These individuals lower the 
obstacles of labor migration while also encompassing neoliberalism’s goals of free 
markets, entrepreneurial freedom, and free trade. 
 Football labor migration is the product of two desires.  The first is of the football 
player who wants a professional career in Europe.  The second is the desire of football 
agents to earn money.  In terms of Egypt, the desire to play in Europe remains relevant 
because Egypt for football players is perceived as a nodal point between their home 
countries and Europe.  For most players, Egypt is not somewhere they think of playing 
themselves.  It is something proposed to them by sports agents and social networks.  This 
chapter seeks to answer why, how, and with whom does a sub-Saharan African football 
player come to Egypt.  I have used the network approach by J-B Meyer to understand 
how certain persons facilitate migration.  This chapter argues that sports agents are the 
primary facilitators of football labor migration through the use of their professional 
networks coupled with migrant push and pull factors.  Sports agents take advantage of the 
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favorable economic situation in Egypt and commodify players through labor arbitrage by 
obtaining contracts in a more developed higher priced market. 
Migrating From Sub-Saharan Africa to Egypt 
As discussed in chapter one, Egypt’s national league has sizable 
commercialization that primarily focuses on accruing wealth from certain broadcasting 
rights, team and league sponsorship, and billboard advertising within football stadiums.  
Other forms of sports marketing have not developed in Egypt because of a lack of market 
research which could convince sports bodies to invest in different forms of sports 
marketing (Mohammed and Ibrahim 2006b).  Half of the 2010-2011 Egyptian Premier 
League teams are owned by government ministries or state-owned businesses.  Backing 
from these institutions provides stable financial conditions for sports clubs in Egypt.  
Egypt’s Premier League developed profitable football industry, coupled with Egypt’s 
economic factors, and liberal visa regulations enables football agents, who primarily 
encourage football labor migration, to make worthwhile investments while creating an 
appealing environment for African football players. 
World systems theory posits: “the international flow of labor follows the 
international flow of goods and capital, but in the opposite direction.  Capitalist 
investment foments changes that create an uprooted, mobile population in peripheral 
countries, while simultaneously forging strong material and cultural links with core 
countries leading to transnational movement” (Massey et al. 1996:197).  Spatially, world-
systems theory constructs Europe as one of the powerful “core” that dominates 
economically, the southern periphery (Africa and Latin America).  World-Systems theory 
explains relations of power by approaching the structures that enable the flow of 
commodities; however, it overlooks how local and transnational human interactions and 
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social networking constitute the structures of movement (Meyer 2001:95).  For African 
football labor, a sports agent and his social network are the primary means to migration. 
African football players are funneled through networks that start in their home 
countries and end in Egypt.  Football agents are the primary propellers of these networks.  
These sports agents offer to accompany players to Egypt in order to try-out and acquire a 
contract.  Sports agents recruit several players at once and bring them to Egypt in groups 
in order increase the odds of profiting from this time and monetary investment.  The word 
“agent” connotes two different inter-related types of people. The word itself means 
someone who has an active role in facilitating migration, which I refer to as facilitators.  
These include managers, businessmen, sports agents, football industry officials, and other 
entrepreneurs.  For players, a sports agent is someone who represents them and networks 
on their behalf.   
Human mediation is important to the migration process; it initiates the movement 
of a football player’s body.  It is beyond just being a minor outlying factor leftover from 
supply and demand.  “As such they [human mediations] are more than mere instruments.  
They are components and determinants of the migration process” (Meyer 2001:94).  Most 
football players migrated because of their agent’s networking whether they were assisted 
by agents or recruited by clubs.  Others relayed information about Egypt to independent 
players.  The independents also hired agents upon arrival; two of them have successfully 
obtained contracts as mentioned in their introductions. 
Ghanaian player, Martin migrated to Egypt through his Egyptian agent, whom 
Martin described as traveling often to Ghana:  
He was Egyptian.  He usually comes to Ghana season to season.  Then I met him 
and we spoke together he feel the style of my playing.  So he can easily find a 
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team or something for me in Egypt here.  And I said no problem and he took some 
of my CDs and my CV.  I made a CV for him and I give to him.  He said I should 
come to justify.  I should come to try out so then I came [to Egypt]. 
 
Martin asked several of his brothers and friends about Egypt and whether it was a 
worthwhile opportunity before agreeing to travel to Egypt.  Martin’s agent arranged and 
paid for Martin’s transportation costs.  He then came to Egypt to complete several try-
outs and eventually obtained a contract, as he explains: 
So I came and it was a bit difficult but as time goes on, I start acclimatizing to the 
situation, the atmosphere.  And they said I should wait for one week to two weeks 
to play for the team again for them to see how, I mean how impressive or what 
involvement they see on me.  So after one week to ten days, they said no problem 
and they will sign a contract and he [the agent] spoke to them and they finalized 
everything and I go to play for the team. And I asked my brothers because of 
Aboutrike and AbouZaki the national players the national team players you 
know?  They were well known so we want to play beside them. You see.  You to 
be proud of it so I mean we end up being Half Egyptian, Half Ghanaian on the 
pitch playing. 
 
Martin explained to me that without his agent, he would not have been able to obtain the 
contract because a recommendation, like in other forms of employment, is key to getting 
noticed and legitimized.  Skills alone will not enable you to move forward in your career.  
He hopes to have a future career working as a talent scout within the global football 
industry. 
Like Martin, Fred came to Egypt from Ghana at the expense of his Ghanaian 
agent.  He successfully tried out with an Egyptian club in Alexandria who offered him a 
contract.  A football agent is important to the migration of these athletes and their careers.  
It is only if one has a ‘good’ agent, that one’s travel costs will be reimbursed by a 
player’s new club through contract negotiations.  
Ricky came to Egypt through a French agent who he described as taking his 
money and subsequently abandoning him after failed try-outs.  Ricky paid for his travel 
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costs because his agent did not know his skill because the agent had not observed him 
enough. Ricky said: “because if the agent manger knows your skill, they will pay for you, 
if they do not, they will have you pay, and possibly reimburse you.”  He feels he was 
completely misguided by his agent who brought him to Egypt.  When he initially did not 
obtain a contract, the agent left Ricky behind in Cairo to fend for himself.  He was able to 
obtain a contract with a second tier team on his own through contacts he had made when 
his agent was still representing him. 
The network approach to migration understands that skilled migration has many 
active developed networks and channels with an invariable number of agents or facilitates 
that allow for migration flows from the periphery to the core (Meyer 2001:92).  These 
various facilitators within the football industry networks include footballer agents, sports 
agents, salaried club recruiters, tipsters, local African businessmen, local football clubs 
and teams, and independent and European funded football academies in Western Africa.  
Most footballers do not leave their home countries by their own initiative; football agents 
and facilitators, create the initiative for them.  We can draw upon many similarities 
between skilled migrants and football labor migrants. 
The idea of networking and networks is not new to migration research.  The social 
networks of migrants are key in helping them adapt and integrate into society by helping 
find accommodation, employment, and access social programs.  The social networks also 
facilitate the migration of relatives by connecting them and qualifying them for national 
immigration programs (Vertovec 2002:3).  The process of migration for skilled labor like 
football labor is different from unskilled migration.  Skilled laborers tend to use non-kin 
contacts in their network to facilitate migration.  Skilled migrants and football labor 
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migrants differ in the matter of whose social network is most valuable. A sports agent’s 
social network is far more important in facilitating the movement of football players than 
the football player’s actual social network.  An agent’s social network obtains the try-out 
for their players and mediates contracts.  Connections are key in enabling a career to 
progress to more competitive leagues.  The social ties of the migrant or football player 
with his agent affect where he migrates, how he migrates, and “future prospects for 
physical and occupational mobility” (Vertovec 2002:3). 
Within a West African footballer’s home country it is not uncommon to be 
approached by football agents promising players tryouts and success in foreign countries.  
In Nigeria alone, there are 119 licensed player agents (FIFA 2010:1).  This does not 
include foreign football agents and scouts that travel to and work in Nigeria.  There are 
also dozens of men who pose as agents and reap benefits from football players’ dreams of 
professionalism by misleading them and taking their money.  Henry explains that agents 
are helpful, but you have to be careful: “even if you are hired from there [Ghana], it is 
easier to get to get a visa if an agent wants to hook you up.  There are a lot of people who 
are not good agents.  They claim to be able to get you a contract with Madrid.  You give 
them money and they disappear.” 
To understand the agent’s role in facilitating and expanding football labor 
migration, it is necessary to perceive the migration of football talent as not only a push 
and pull attraction, but a complex set of linkages that enable the flow of talent from 
Africa to Egypt.  Martin, the Ghanaian player, himself works as a facilitator within the 
football industry.  When I asked him what he would like to do after his career, he told me 
that he intended on retiring in five years no matter whether he had improved or not.  He is 
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the only player who I met whose long-term goal did not involve obtaining a contact in 
Europe.  His real goal in becoming a professional player was to be able to network in 
order to become what he termed as a “coordinator.”  He initially described this career as a 
“manager, a coordinator of plays, money or something.”  He has already started 
“coordinating” in his spare time.  He currently has contacts in Ghana, Russia, London, 
Turkey, and Lebanon.  He claims that he is not a sports agent.  He wants to work to 
connect players with agents:  
Not an agent… as such… you know agents… I mean agents… it’s like a 
restriction for someone, but being a coordinator you have an extra… I mean extra 
chance to penetrate.  I am sitting.  I am a coordinator.  I can commit this one with 
this agent, this one with this agent.  You know by being agent you have to be on 
your own, you have to go and fight.  I mean I will search and give it to you, you 
as an agent.  Then you fight for the player to get a team.  
 
Despite claiming that he is not a sports agent, he will be a facilitator of migration and 
movement within the networks that he creates.  I would describe him as a freelance talent 
scout.  He also charges a fee of five percent of player’s professional contract, which he 
perceives as a small fee.  Martin is an example of facilitators of football labor migration 
who are not licensed sports agents.  They are not officially registered with FIFA or their 
country’s association or federation.  Martin has neither passed the FIFA exam required to 
be a licensed agent nor does he intend to.  He is working to become part an informal 
sector that networks in order to move players from club to club on a local and 
transnational level.  These facilitators and sports agents are a necessary part of the 
football industry that move labor from club to club.  
It is understood that one needs an agent in order to be able to further one’s career. 
As Castro explains: “as footballers, yeah, you need an agent because sometimes playing 
alone is not enough.”  Agents go beyond just representation like a lawyer, but they are 
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necessary to market the player.  Martin explained to me: “you need someone to marketize 
you.”  When I asked him, if he marketed himself in reference to his work as a 
“coordinator” he replied while laughing: 
Yes, exactly that is how we do in our transactions. You need to recommend.  You 
have to recommend…I mean you need to get some skills and those things.  You 
give out recommendation; it will be better and it will be easier.  Most of the 
players, they are coming here [Egypt], too on that recommendation.  So if you 
come, one match, two match…  It is okay, then you will sign a contract.  But 
without a recommendation, you keep on doing try-outs, try-outs, try-outs, try-outs 
till one month and they will say no you’re done. 
 
A player needs to be marketed by a representative outside of the player’s own network in 
order to find a contract and move abroad.  Martin continues to talk about what he calls 
“pragmatism” in order to explain the practicality of having contacts and a social network 
in order to match athletes with clubs as a quality service: 
And they have something called pragmatism… I mean in the work of 
coordination or something the pragmatic in it sitting alone, sitting alone in the 
meditating how to bring things together how to bring things together then you 
utilize it you share in it.  The amount of the adgents [sic], I mean agents it takes a 
lot of, I mean things or factors. There are some factors that need to be considered 
in order to get to use I mean things.  You need to sacrifice you need to a match 
how do you call it? A quality service and quality service will never be established 
unless you have I mean the thing of the pragmatic.  Humiliation or sometimes I 
mean players are lost you know a lot of things as a process as you know.  You 
need to sacrifice as well in order to get to it. 
 
Like in other forms of skilled migration, there is a large interplay between the employer, 
the football player, and their connection.  Meyer explains that “the pre-existing 
relationship between the (future) employee and the employer through the intermediary of 
an individual known by both not only provides the employee with information about the 
job but also guarantees the employer that she/he is, to a certain extent, appropriate for the 
vacant post” (2001:94).  Engineers and information technologists tend to migrate through 
foreign embassy programs, headhunters, recruiting organizations, and private migration 
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consultants (Meyer 2001:101).  Meyer explains that these intermediaries have a large 
influence on moving labor abroad: 
These organizational intermediaries are actively putting potential employers into 
contact with employees at a global level.  Evidence shows that these 
intermediaries do create incentives to move, through all kinds of socio-technical 
devices for people who, in many instances, did not express a prior intention to 
leave (Meyer 2001:101).   
 
Like engineers and information technologists, football players move through more 
institutionalized channels. These channels include football agents and club recruiters. 
 Economic terms known as supply and demand dictate that the demand of certain 
skills contributes the most to migration flows reflect the economic needs of the host-
country; however, Meyer suggests that evidence demonstrates that the intermediaries 
between the migrant and employer create the demand for labor: 
The very content of supply and demand is shaped by the networks, by their actors 
and intermediaries.  In fact, there is a co-evolution of supply and demand, and 
networks through which the adjustments occur…the supply of highly skilled 
manpower is hardly self-declared: it is the result of very active ‘demand carriers’” 
(2001:103). 
 
One Egyptian agent named Mohammed actively strives to obtain his client’s contracts in 
Europe and has a transnational professional network, which he actively seeks to expand.  
“I have some people in Turkey, England, and Belgium.  I have sent someone to Ghana to 
recruit players to bring here [Egypt] for two years and then bring them to Europe. Egypt 
is the mid-way.”  He recently became an agent and has worked hard to expand his 
network:  
Four years ago, I started with unknown players, I tried hard to get some networks 
outside Egypt.  I started to go to London to have meetings there.  I am 
concentrating on how to get Egyptian players outside Egypt.  Not all of the 
[Egyptian] players want to play in Europe they go and then they want to come 
back. 
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Egyptians are particularly popular in Belgium, yet it is the agent’s network that created 
the opening for Egyptian players.  It is not a particular nationality that is in demand in 
Europe, but variable player profiles that managers seek.  It is agents who create demand 
for certain nationalities.  It is football club staff that contacts Mohammed inquiring if he 
has a player that would fit the profile needed by the manager.  Mohammed said: “Abroad, 
yes, managers ask for help from me to bring them players.  It is best to see the player in 
his best condition in Egypt.  I tell those interested to come to Egypt instead of flying him 
out for a tryout.” 
 The transnational networks that the agent, Mohammed, navigates in order to 
obtain contracts in Europe are based on his own contacts.  Mohammed views Egypt as a 
nodal point to Europe.  Mohammed is purposely seeking to develop foreign players in 
Egypt in order to eventually find them contracts in Europe.  He is also currently trying to 
create a network in Spain as he explained: “Belgium, Turkey, appreciate players from 
Egypt.  We do not have good relations in England because previous players have messed 
it up. Saudi Arabia and Germany also like Egyptian players.  A small percentage of 
everything works out.  No one is playing in Spain.  I have considered studying Spanish to 
help my career” in order to expand his network and potential markets.  Mohammed also 
represents two West Africans who now play in Europe after having spent time playing in 
Egypt.  He describes Africans as easy and simple in comparison to Egyptian players who 
according to him, his wife describes as in need of “babysitting” in order for them to 
adjust to their careers in Europe.  African players “are easy.  You get them there [Europe] 
and they do their job.” 
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Migration Networks in and out of Egypt to Asia and the Americas 
 
As previously noted in chapter two, Mouctar has played in multiple Arab 
countries.  He was recruited while competing in a gulf state.  Unlike Mouctar, most 
African players come to Egypt directly from their home countries.  Exceptions like 
Mouctar, are mostly limited to large successful Egyptian Premier League clubs such as 
Ahly or Zamalek because they can afford to pay transfer fees.  Players recruited beyond 
their home countries are usually scouted in tournaments around Africa and the Middle 
East in club and multi-national tournaments.  Within the Arab World, including North 
Africa and the Middle East, players are moved, loaned, and contracted throughout the 
countries.  As the oil-funded building boom of the United Arab Emirates and other Gulf 
countries expands, so does the development of football infrastructure, leagues, and 
institutions.  The football league in the United Arab Emirates has an increased demand 
for talented labor and more prominently, star power.   
 Recently, the captain of the 2006 World Cup Italian winning team, Fabio 
Cannavaro signed a presumed large figure with Dubai’s Al Ahli in June of 2010 (CNN 
2010:1).  Because of the Gulf’s vast oil revenues, contracts in the Gulf Countries 
including the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia offer 
larger incomes than contracts typically found in Egypt.  Migration flows in both direction 
between Egypt and the Gulf states.  Interest in players within Egypt goes beyond Africa, 
Asia, and Europe.  It has expanded to include the importation of labor from Latin 
America and labor migration to Latin America.  One Nigerian player named Napoleon 
had tried out with an Argentinean club team, which was working to negotiate a loan with 
his current team in Egypt at the time of interview.  In the end, he remained in Egypt.  
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During the 2009-2010 football season, there were three Brazilian football players playing 
in the Egypt football league in all divisions.  Mouctar moved from Northern Africa to the 
Gulf and then back to North Africa, where in plays in Cairo.  Sports agents and club 
scouts facilitated his movement across multiple countries. 
Other Push and Pull Factors 
In the previous chapter I introduced Castro, who migrated to Egypt the 
encouragement of a Ghanaian agent.  He emphasized the fact that playing in same league 
as Egyptian player Aboutrika8 influenced his decision in coming to Egypt: 
I met a guy who was Ghanaian, who I spoke to.  I met him a couple times.  He is 
from Ghana. He is a Ghanaian. Then I spoke to other people that told me like 
Egypt is good.  The football has improved and all that and so making the decision 
to come to Egypt. It wasn’t a big thing to do because I knew about Aboutrika. 
Aboutrika is no nono… he is a living legend.  Yeah coming here and playing in 
the same league as Aboutrika, I couldn’t say no, so I came.  So Aboutrika I would 
say he was really part of it.  He was like 80% part of the deal.  Although I didn’t 
talk to him, I didn’t know him.  Just him being here, playing in Egypt he had 
inspired me to come. 
 
This Ghanaian agent that Castro met with several times was able to obtain him a contract 
in Egypt.  The sports agent asked Castro if he was interested in playing for an Egyptian 
team who was thinking about hiring him.  As he explained, he obtained references from 
other players in Egypt about the Egyptian Premier League to make the decision carefully.  
Despite the strong influence of agents in footballer’s career choices, there are external 
forces that provide motivation for players to leave, like Aboutrika in Castro’s case.   
Independent players are the clearest example of this.  Zinedine, Thomas, and 
Aquib all came to Egypt with no contractual obligations to any club or sports agent.  
                                                8 Mohammed Aboutrika plays for Al-Ahly and is a member of the Egyptian National Team.  He has played 
in a prominent role in Egypt’s last three consecutive African Cup of Nations. He is a top player in Egypt 
and African.  He is the 2006 CAF player of the year.  He has also been named the best player in Egypt fives 
times (2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008). 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Thomas migrated to Egypt after talking with some agents in Nigeria.  Instead of hiring 
one of them, he felt it was better to migrate to Egypt independent of an agent. They were 
influenced by perceptions of the football industry in Egypt by those within their local 
football industry. 
Similar to the “American Dream,” Europe, as a spatial entity, provides 
imaginations of prosperity, success, and wealth for those within the football world.  
Those ideas are not far-fetched given the average salary of football players in Western 
Europe.  The success a player could achieve in Europe will directly bring him “home.”  
Their success will give them the exposure to their country’s football federation that will 
enable them to be capped9 or included in the national team for international matches.  
Playing for one’s home country is “the ultimate dream of football players,” according to 
Mouctar.  In order to play for their home country, such as Ghana or Nigeria, they must 
play in Europe due to the fact that their national team is very competitive.  In order to 
facilitate the process of going “home,” players use Egypt as nodal point within the global 
football industry.  
Egypt’s reputation in Africa is uniquely prestigious.  Many players have told me 
that the Egyptian national team is the best in Africa, a view confirmed by the Egyptian 
team’s three consecutive African Nations’ Cup titles since 2006.  A Nigerian player 
named Fred explained to me that Egypt was closer to Europe and therefore, will provide 
the best access to contracts in Europe in comparison to South Africa, which has a similar 
industry to Egypt: “I have better chance of going to Europe.  If you look at the map it is 
closer to Europe.  Egypt was closer to me than South Africa.  Egypt is the best in Africa.” 
                                                9 When a player is assigned to international match for their national team, they are “capped” in reference to 
when a player used to receive a commemorative cap for each international match played. 
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The elevated reputation is especially apparent considering that Francophone 
players could attempt to play professionally in similar conditions in Moroccan or 
Tunisian clubs, but choose to instead to play in Egypt.  Tunisia and Morocco have equal 
levels of commercialism and development in comparison to Egypt.  All three countries 
have a more profitable football industry than West Africa and provide better salaries to 
their players.  They could easily network without having to learn Arabic and/or English. 
Many players are usually provided with translators, if they have a contract.  However, 
Egypt is still a larger adjustment.  These francophone players choose the harder route.  
Zinedine is a prime example as he is an independent Guinean player explained to me that 
he came to Egypt because he will be better trained, as he explains: 
It betters us [francophone players] to go here [Egypt] in comparison to Morocco, 
Algeria or Tunisia.  Despite that they have the same system of life and the same 
manner of practicing football, their  [Egyptian] football is somewhat more 
advanced in comparison to football in Morocco… Here football is a little good.  
When you leave here [Egypt] with a good training and when you leave to Europe 
or other championships you should be able to hold your own.  Comparatively for 
example in Morocco or in Tunisia when you leave, you see some gaps; you see 
some errors to rectify… Comparatively here when you leave it is certain that you 
are well trained.10 
 
These football players challenge themselves in Egypt, where most football professionals 
do not even speak English let alone French because they consider the level of play to be 
best in Egypt.  Migration and playing in Egypt is an investment in one’s human capital. 
                                                
10 Original quote in French: “parce que là on s’est mieux aller ici par rapport au Maroc ou en Algérie ou en 
Tunisie. Tu vois malgré que ils aient le même system de vie et la même manière de pratiquer le football 
mais eux leur football soit un peu avancé par rapport de football du Maroc. Tu vois ? Ici le football est un 
peu bon. Quand tu quitte ici par une bonne formation ici.  Quand tu partis en Europe ou que des autres 
championnats tu dois tenir.  Comparativement par exemple  au Maroc ou en Tunisie quand tu pars tu vois 
quelques lacunes tu vois quelques erreurs à rectifier,  tu vois?  Comparativement ici quand tu pars c’est sûre 
que tu es bien formé. Comprends?”  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Some players described leaving home for factors not directly related to football. 
For example, Thomas described routine violence between Muslims and Christians in 
Nigeria as a significant factor in his immigration to Egypt.  As Thomas described to me: 
“My dream is to go to Europe. It is very difficult to get to Europe.  I cannot go there 
easily.  There was war in the south where I am from in Nigeria; the war was hard.  My 
brother is in the United Kingdom.  We are lucky that we survived.  I can come to escape 
to Egypt with hope of going to Europe.” 
Lillian Farrell writes: “a cultural competence (such as being able to navigate 
working and living abroad) derives a scarcity value and yields profits of distinction for its 
owner” (2010:111).   Migration is an investment in human capital, whether in the form of 
international migration or rural to urban migration.  The investment in migration will 
increase the future monetary income of the migrant (Jauhiainen 2008:98).  Some African 
football players perceive employment abroad as the sole requisite to being a professional 
football player because it holds such profitability and prestige.  By playing abroad, a 
football player like Napoleon improves his game, but also his marketability.  It brings 
him prestige that he can then leverage to obtain better contracts in the future, whether in 
Egypt or elsewhere.  When I asked Napoleon if he had a choice in coming to Egypt he 
replied: “Yeah I had a choice.  I can decide not to come.  But you know I just want to be 
a professional soccer player. Playing in your country alone is not enough for you.  You 
have to go to certain places to see different coaches and styles of play and to make your 
CV [Curriculum Vitae] very strong.”  
The potential economic benefits of moving to Egypt are enticing.  Yet 
demonstrated above by Napoleon, the investment in human capital through migration is 
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not solely the immediate economic benefit, but it is also an investment that pays off later 
after training and competing in Egypt. Considering the Egyptian Premier League is 
capable of paying its players an average wage of $120,000 per season, a considerable 
sum for any country, the player has the potential to earn large amounts of income. 
With large amounts of poverty in their home countries, football becomes a way 
out and even a second choice as a career.  Football presents a form of economic 
opportunity that most players are unable to imagine at home in other professions.  The 
lack of available employment and economic instability push many young men to seek a 
professional football career.  A career as a professional footballer is a lifelong passion for 
some and it is a backup career for others.  Young men describe turning to football when 
their educational opportunities have run dry due to the financial instability or their 
economic situation is so terrible that even with a bachelor’s degree they have no choice 
but to become a professional football player.  Others speak of football as a stepping-stone 
to something else they desire.  
Fred, who has a bachelor’s degree in accounting, explained to me that he would 
like to pursue his graduate degree somewhere other than Egypt.  In order for him to have 
economic opportunity at home, he needed to have a degree from abroad.  Instead of 
applying directly to a university in Europe or America, he is choosing to wait until he 
obtains a football contract in Europe.  Football is a stepping-stone to him being able to 
obtain a master’s degree.  The limitations of a student visa in some countries, such as 
England, would limit one’s access to employment as a foreign national.  It would be 
harder to get by with limited income.  A sponsored workers visa would allow a player to 
continue earning an income as a professional football player and pursue higher education 
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at the same time, assuming the player actually had time to juggle both schedules.  Fred 
does not envision time to do both as a problem. 
Paul chose to become a football player because he lacked a family member to 
support him in continuing his education.  He had no choice but to pursue a football career 
in order to pursue higher education and to survive financially.  For both Paul and Fred, 
education and other careers not associated with the football industry are their end and 
football is merely a source of income towards those ends. 
Labor Arbitrage: Territorialization of Values 
 I was traveling in a taxi from the Zamalek island neighborhood to downtown 
Cairo, as we passed Ahly Football club, my taxi driver called out to a man on the street.  
It turns out that this man was an injured Egyptian Ahly player who the taxi driver had 
encouraged to get healthy.  It was obvious that he was an Ahly football fan. When I asked 
what he thought of African players playing in Egypt, he replied: “they are good for 
football here, but they really should be paid better.” 
The market for cheap football labor has increased exponentially since the 1990’s 
through the relaxing of foreign labor quotas and labor arbitrage of Africans and Latin 
Americans in Europe.  Arbitrage refers to the practice of exploiting price discrepancies 
between two separate markets by redistributing the lower priced item in higher priced 
markets (Ong 2010:98).  Though arbitrage of items is not new, the arbitrage of labor is.  
Sports agents profit from price discrepancies between sub-Saharan African and Egypt.   
These discrepancies are the motivating force behind a sports agents desire to facilitate 
transnational football labor migration to Egypt.  By signing a more expensive contract the 
agents earns more.  They usually earn 10% of a player’s annual salary.  Aihwa Ong 
demonstrates this through the example of Indian laborers in the high tech industry who 
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are contracted to work in California, at much lower rates than local American hires 
(2005:160-161).   
In addition to agents, teams also take advantage of labor arbitrate because they 
can save money on their operational costs.  Like Asian contract workers in the Silicon 
Valley, African football players represent a form of labor arbitrage, where their skills of 
equal level to local footballers are imported to save costs and thus increase profits for 
football clubs in Europe and other regions, not only through paying the player, less but 
through trading and lending the player to other teams for a profit. 
 Smaller clubs in lower divisions or in smaller European countries do not have the 
fan base or budgets to deal with rising operational costs.  They are under a lot of pressure 
to balance their budgets and resort to importing cheaper labor from abroad (Alegi 
2010:98).  As Alegi explains: 
Under enormous pressure to balance the books and remain competitive, ordinary 
clubs developed a business strategy focused on cutting costs and generating 
profits by purchasing inexpensive young talents in Africa (and Latin America) 
and later reselling them at higher prices on the European Market.  The vertiginous 
growth of African Migration in the second half of the 1990s was incontrovertible: 
from about 350 in 1996 to 2000 (2010:98). 
 
Labor arbitrage allows companies or football clubs to pay one labor pool less than 
another.  This inexpensive labor pool is typically dislocated geographically, most often in 
off-shoring (Ing 2006:160).  Major European clubs can develop and train labor less 
expensively through acquiring football clubs and academies in West Africa.  The most 
talented developed labor can also be sold, with great profit to European clubs (Darby et 
al. :149). Castro has issues with labor arbitrage and blames not only clubs and agents for 
unequal pay, but the players themselves: 
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Some of foreigner African players who come in here…Sometimes they them 
themselves make, they make we some other Africans cheap… because me for 
instance if you want to give me a certain money and I don’t want to take it.  The 
team approaches another African player lets say they want to give me 100,000 
dollars and I don’t want to take it.  I say it’s too small.  They approach another 
African player, the African player will say look don’t give me 100,000 dollars, 
just give me $20,000 and I will do the work for you.  So then it makes us always 
always cheap.  And it will not change because the people do not want to change.  
Their mentality does not want to change, which is wrong.  If you know that you 
are good, and you know how to do the job.  If they give you a certain money you 
say no. This is too small. And they go in for another African player whose as 
good as you.  He also has to say look this money is small.  So at least the people 
will start changing.  Their mentality will start changing.  Look, we cannot get 
these people for cheaper anymore because they are good.  Because the football 
player we do more running.  We work a lot.  We handle the things on the field 
because that is why they buy us.  So we have to understand we have to make the 
people understand this if this is what we are doing on the field then they have to 
pay more instead.  Because if you bring Merci in to Egypt to play lets say Ahly 
you can’t give Merci the money you give Aboutrika. Although Aboutrika is a 
legend, but trust Merci is good. 
A player’s desperation to play and to have a contract forces him to cheapen himself 
according to Castro.  After the interview, he told me about a player he had just met who 
signed a contract with an Egyptian club that gave him a salary of $200 U.S. a year. 
Football clubs benefit from contracting players at a lower rate than a local player of equal 
skill in order to balance budget and earn more profit. Hopefully, clubs pay the African 
player more than what he could make at home; however, the experience of Castro’s 
acquaintance indicates that this might not always be the case. 
 Thomas currently earns 200 U.S. dollars a month, which he sees as a good 
starting wage.  I have not been able to find statistics about the average salary of football 
players in Egypt, both Egyptians and Africans alike have confessed to me that Africans 
are paid less than Egyptians.  This has negative effect on the players who hold out for 
better pay, who risk losing the potential contract when an equally talented player is 
willing to sign a contract worth a lesser value.  Labor arbitrage is one way in which 
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agents and football clubs commodify and objectify their players.  By networking in a 
foreign country, sports agents can seek to earn larger amounts of income off a player in 
Egypt than in Ghana or other West African countries while clubs stand to benefit from 
lower operational costs. 
Conclusion 
 
“In football if you have a good agent, then you can reach anywhere you want.  If 
you don’t than you can’t go anywhere.  You need a good agent to get a contract… 
you cannot play otherwise.” –Fred, Ghana 
 
A sports agent is the primary facilitator of football labor migration to Egypt 
because the agent’s social network enables players to obtain try-outs and are the primary 
means to which they even consider playing in Egypt.  There remain exceptions to this, 
such as independent players, yet these individuals came because of influences by others 
in the football industry through the dissemination of information.  Without individuals 
sharing information about Egypt’s football scene, these independent players, like their 
counterparts who came to Egypt because of a sports agent’s initiative, would have no 
knowledge of Egypt’s football industry.   
The agents objectify these players as a means to their own end, which is to earn 
money.  Labor arbitrage is their means of taking advantage of price discrepancies to earn 
more, which clubs also seek to extort.  These prices discrepancies are based on the 
territorialized values that change between different space and countries.  The importance 
of player values is discussed in the next chapter. 
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4. Human Capital: Negotiating 
Neoliberalism, Commodification, and 
Labor Needs 
 
The concept of human capital theorized by Becker (1975) forms the theoretical 
base of this chapter.  Human capital is the investment in certain processes, such as 
migration, on the job training, and medical treatment that influences the future monetary 
income of individuals as a method of improving output (Becker 1975:9).  In the Fordist 
economic system, employers and companies invested in human capital to increase output 
and instill loyalty to the company.  The neoliberal economic system today approaches 
human capital investment as primarily the responsibility of the individual and not the 
employer.  Loyalty is not expected; labor is very mobile and experiences high turnover.  
As described in the introduction of this thesis, neoliberalism is made up of ideologies and 
policies that seek to further expand global capital accumulation “through free trade, 
financial deregulation, privatization, World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
World Trade Organization (WTO), and kindred organizations” (Mensah 2008:1).     
In an increasingly neoliberal world, sports clubs stand apart as they continue to 
invest in human capital through on the job training and specialized medical attention.  In 
an industry that promotes and profits from the spectacle of athletic competition, the need 
for valuable, agile bodies is of the utmost importance.  Yet despite the fact that football 
clubs must invest in their players’ human capital, they must also adapt to a neoliberal 
world of mobile labor, casualized employee-employer relationships, and capital flows.  
This chapter seeks to explain the commodification of African football players carried out 
 75 
by sports clubs and sports agents by using a Marxist definition of a commodity and 
Becker’s (1975) understanding of human capital.   
Although formal FIFA regulations allow for free agency and thus formally seem 
to diminish the level of commodification, a number of other factors may have led to a 
proliferation of language and practices treating players as commodities.  What is 
particularly interesting about football players is that they are not only a labor force, but 
also a commodity, in that the right to hire them is a product that clubs sell to one another.  
Football players are commodities while under contract, but they cease to retain a 
commodity-value when they become a free-agent meaning without a contract.  There are 
managers, medical staff, and other club staff that work to shape the final product, which 
includes improving the output of football labor.  The relationship between the final 
product and the football player is peculiar because a football player simultaneously 
creates and comprises part of the commodity produced.  The commodity they are 
producing for public consumption is the football match in and of itself, which is a 
commercialized endeavor that produces a consumable product.  Pierre Bourdieu’s (1998) 
theory of the commercialization of football in Europe postulates that football is no longer 
solely played, but is similar to a concert.  Football is performed as a spectacle, as a 
consumable commodity.  By simultaneously providing labor and being the product of this 
labor and the labor of club staff, a football player becomes a large monetary and human 
capital investment that football clubs try to exploit in hope of gaining surplus value from 
the player in the football labor trade markets.  This results in the commodification of the 
football player.  
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Invoking Karl Marx in the context of football, the player, like other commodities, 
has an exchange-value and the use-value of the player.  The player’s body is the site of 
value.  It is not only a means of production, but it is a resulting commodity.  Football 
players, sports clubs, and sports agents actively try to increase the worth of the use-value 
and exchange-value.  These two values are improved upon through investing in human 
capital.  Agents and clubs improve the human capital and use-value of a football player 
through age falsification, medical treatment, and training.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
Investments in Human Capital 
 
Before continuing it needs to be explained that an African football player is not 
commodified in every sense of the word.  They are not slaves despite how controlled 
their lives will appear to be in chapter five.  The players I interviewed have a degree of 
agency and autonomy.  In fact since the 1980’s and 1990’s, players have become less 
commodified than they were before unrestricted free agency.  This is in direct contrast 
with the commodifying regimes implemented by neoliberalism to find profit in 
previously unknown markets such as the football industry itself and for-profit educational 
institutions.  Regulations implemented by FIFA in the 1980s and the 1990s and the 
Bosman ruling relaxed laws, loosening controls on mobility and employment.  The 
Bosman ruling created free agency between European Union member states at the 
completion of a player’s contract, which gave him the right to contract with any team, 
ending the retention system that had allowed teams to charge a transfer fee after a 
player’s contract had expired.  In addition, individual national associations have relaxed 
their foreign player quotas, England has completely deregulated their labor market, 
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ending all foreign players quotas.   Egypt has a far more restrictive policy of three foreign 
players per team. 
Both Karl Marx’s concept of commodification and Gary Becker’s idea of human 
capital developed under different circumstances than the present global economic system 
and how they are used in this thesis.  Neither of them completely foresaw neoliberalism 
as both theories predate its existence.  Furthermore Marx and Becker’s theories neither 
share the same framework nor come from the same discursive angles.  Marx is economic 
historian and theorist while Becker is a liberal economist.  By drawing upon both of their 
approaches and applying them to a neoliberal context, I am able to understand why 
football clubs invest in human capital while also negotiating the neoliberal global 
economic system. 
The Marxist definition of a commodity is something that is “in the first place, an 
object outside us, a thing by its properties satisfies human wants of some sort or another” 
(Marx 1906:41).  A commodity has many aspects.  These include a use-value, which is 
the utility of the commodity, an exchange-value, which is the worth of a commodity in 
exchange for other goods, and lastly a price, which is the monetary exchange-value 
(Marx 1901:42-6).  Commodification is the process by which an object, services, or 
something traditionally neither a good nor service (such as human beings or the 
environment) is given value within these intrinsic aspects described above (Polyani 
2004:4).  One term I do not take from Marx’s work on labor and commodities is his 
notion of “value”, which he defined as how much human labor is involved in producing 
the commodity (Marx 1901:42).  If the word “value” is used in this thesis, it refers to its 
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general sense within the English language or the two Marxian categories discussed 
above. 
Investments in human capital are part of the commodification process by which 
certain investments lead to greater future monetary income of the individual players as 
well as their football agents and football clubs.  A larger monetary-value and use-value 
are the most beneficial to all of these parties.  An increased exchange-value is a source of 
potential profits for the sports club.  An increased use-value will reflect in a future higher 
wage for the player, a higher commission for his sports agent, and a more efficient 
employee for the football club.  Below are the three forms of human capital investment 
that appeared in my research: age falsification, medical support, and on the job training 
provided by the coaching staff. 
Pretending to be Younger 
 
“Africans in general from east to west, if you want to survive if you want to 
survive, you have to neglect… the origin of your life [Castro laughing in the 
background] to pack it aside and open another chapter.”-Martin, from Ghana 
Sub-Saharan African players have been involved in their local (African) football 
scene for years.  Many start off in local clubs and football academies.   Through games 
and competitions, they find exposure.  As previously explained in chapter three, local 
sports agents are the primary contacts that influence footballers to journey to Egypt.  
Local agents attract potential athletes by convincing them that Egypt maintains better 
football salaries and a higher level of play that could afford them a prosperous football 
career as well as exposure, which could enable them to obtain contracts in Europe. As 
Martin is quoted saying above, there is this idea among some players and sports agents 
that football players have “to start over” when they come to Egypt.  “To start over” they 
falsify their ages in order to appear younger.  Because of preconceived notions of ageism 
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in Egypt, African football players are encouraged, if not forced, by their agents to change 
all of their documents including passports, birth certificates, and other forms of 
identification before departing home. When I asked Martin why he changed his age, he 
replied: “just to catch up on the situation…my agent told me to change it because if I am 
old if I am older I cannot come.  To [be] professional you have to be young in order to 
come [to Egypt].”   
Agents working in players’ home countries encourage or as in the case of 
Martin’s agent even require age falsification because they believe that in Egypt younger 
players are more marketable.  Players adopt the same belief as the agent such as the case 
for Ricky who explained the reasons for age falsification as: “they do not like big age; 
they like small age.  It is not the same age in Ghana.  I have fake documents.  Before you 
do [obtain] passports, you have to change everything of yours, so everything is 
consistent.”  In addition to Ricky and Martin, Zinedine as well as Thomas and several of 
his friends who I had met at the birthday party for a young Nigerian girl directly admitted 
to me or insinuated that they all had documents that falsified their age.  Zinedine was the 
first player to inform me of age falsification practices by asking me if I wanted his real 
age or his football age when I asked him how old he was.  I then asked Zinedine what 
exactly he meant: 
My football player age is eighteen years, but I really am twenty-five years old. 
Why? Because imagine that I am twenty-five years old.  It is high in regards to 
football. You see? The moment you see me, do you see me as twenty-five years 
old? No, so it is a little that, I cannot say I am twenty-five years old, the moment 
of departure, from the moment I leave for here [Egypt].  It is not good for me. It is 
not only here.  In Europe, they do it.  In South America it is done. It is done all 
around the world.  You see? Even here they do it. You see?  It is a secret, we do 
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not tell everyone.  It is impossible.  But now since 1 February, I have been 
eighteen years old11. 
Unlike Zinedine who indicates that he changed his age to below 18 years of age, most  
change their age to eighteen years old.  FIFA legislation restricts the movement and 
employment of minors, therefore it is not advantageous to falsify below the age of 
eighteen.  Zinedine continued on to ask me to look at him and see if I could tell how old 
he was.  He believed he looked eighteen years old.  I was unable to determine if he was 
older.  He also said that age falsification was highly secretive and that the clubs were not 
aware of this trend.  However as quoted above, Zinedine made it seem that age 
falsification is common practice outside of Africa as well.  If it is so common, team 
managers must be aware.  In addition, club medical staff must notice differences in 
skeletal development and other indicators of age since an eighteen-year-old male has 
most likely not finished puberty and still has the possibility to grow up until one’s early 
twenties.  Whether they truly care would probably depend on the club’s circumstances.  
The issue of age falsification has been discussed on a junior national team level such as 
U-18 and U-20 teams in Nigeria and has been sited as hindering the development of 
football in Africa (see: Olulana 2011; RNW Africa Desk 2009; African Soccer Union 
2010b).  Age falsification on national teams could result in penalties from FIFA against 
the players and federations.  These same players play in professional leagues with an 
                                                
11 Original quote in French: “Mon âge de jouer est 18 ans… mais j’ai vraiment 25. Pourquoi ?  Parce que 
imagine-toi que je dis vingt-cinq ans mon âge est comment?  C’est élevé  en matière de football? Tu vois ?    
Le moment quand tu me vois est-ce que tu peux me voir comme vingt-cinq ans.  Non.  Donc c’est un peu 
ça quoi, je ne peux pas dire que j’ai vingt-cinq ans  le moment de départs, le moment je pars  pour ici. C’est 
pas bon pour moi…Ça c’est pas seulement ici.     En Europe ça ce fait. En Amérique de sud ce fait. Ce fait 
partout  au monde.  Tu vois ? Même ici ça ce fait.    Tu vois ?    C’est un secret on ne le dit pas à tout le 
monde.  C’est impossible.  Mais maintenant en 1 février, j’avais 18 ans.”   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incorrect age.  Based on my research, age falsification within football leagues has yet to 
be addressed by the media or the industry.   
In contradiction to what agents believe in West Africa, Egyptian football agents 
Mohammed and Ehab explained to me that age is not important, it is a player’s skill that 
will get him the position, like other forms of employment.  This remains true in many 
instances as clubs continue to hire and pay transfer fees for contracted players instead of 
waiting for a player’s contract to end or hiring someone else.  These transactions of 
players take place within the labor trade markets, which I discuss later in this chapter.  
What is interesting about these players who falsified their ages is that none of them were 
club-recruited.  All of them were either agent-assisted or independent players who 
obviously were influenced by agents and others in Africa to change their age.  Agents and 
individual players perpetrate age falsification not football clubs.  This demonstrates how 
Mohammed and Ehab are partially correct that age is irrelevant.  Yet to clubs that are 
financially strapped, agents who want a better chance of earning a commission, and 
players who want to extend their career, it is most relevant.   
What perhaps the players, Ehab, and Mohammed have overlooked is the logic 
behind hiring younger players.  Economically they are advantageous.  Younger players 
have a longer and more durable use-value and exchange-value as a commodity.  They are 
cheaper than older athletes.  As well as being a competitive investment, players are an 
economic investment.  Although they may not be as skilled as an older player, younger 
players still have time to develop or “peak” to be a better player.  Therefore, the use-
value of a younger player is less upfront, but in the long-term, the player will gain a large 
differential commodity-value than an older player as long as the player is not injured.   
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According to Becker (1975), increases in wages affect the younger workforce more so 
than older, trained professionals because the younger workforce is less trained and 
therefore is less efficient and less paid.  The younger the employee, the steeper the 
earning curve of the individual because the return on training is collected at later ages 
(Becker 1975:23).  The investment will gain a larger differential-value in comparison to 
an older player.  The older player has more human capital, thus a larger salary and greater 
output, but has a shorter shelf life; therefore older players have less time to gain the same 
difference in exchange-value than a younger player.  Falsifying one’s age is part of the 
process of the player’s commodification because it improves the ability to sell the player 
through perceived future differentials between signing the player, human capital 
investment, and selling the player within the labor trade markets.   
Improving Human Capital Through Training  
 
Training takes place for most teams six days a week unless there is a match.  Like 
the rest of Egypt, Friday is a day off.  Most of the Christian players interviewed attend 
church on Fridays, while their Egyptian teammates spend the day with their families.  
With the exception of the Egyptian league’s breaks, training occurs even in the hot 
months of summer and during the holy month of Ramadan.  Trainings and matches occur 
in the late evening during Ramadan after Iftar dinner or in the very early morning 
everyday.  The leagues do not change their playing schedules based on Ramadan.  
Actually in terms of football, it blossoms during Ramadan.  There are organized 
neighborhood competitions that last till the early hours of the morning everyday.  In the 
colder months, practice takes place during the afternoons.  A player’s day is centered 
around practice also known as training. 
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An average workday for footballers in Egypt starts in the early afternoon. They 
tend to wake up in the late morning as they go to bed very late.  The player then attends 
practice.  Like other sports and teams, Egyptian clubs employ teams of coaching staff that 
are headed by a team manager12.  Assistant coaches have specializations such defense or 
conditioning while the team manager has the most authority.  It is not uncommon in the 
Egyptian Premier League to find foreign coaching staff on club rosters.  Ahly and 
Zamalek have employed numerous foreign team managers over the years.  The coaching 
staff communicates with their players through interpreters and many of the players have 
noted that languages differences are never an obstacle for them when taking direction 
from staff.  It was said to me more than once that football is its own language and 
language differences do not hamper training.   
After practice, the players return home and spend hours watching football 
matches on television.  Except for practice, training, and a little Internet surfing, Castro 
spends most of his day watching football on TV.  “Sometimes life gets boring,” he said. 
My interviewees are heavy consumers of football; they spend countless hours in front of 
the television, watching matches via satellite.  The team manager uses his own techniques 
during training to get his best out of his players.  He also tries control the behavior of his 
players off the field, which is addressed in chapter five, but needs to be explained here in 
the context of human capital.  Egyptians team managers set large restrictions of player 
mobility and social lives in order to produce what they believe is a better labor force.  
The relationship between sub-Saharan football players and their team manager is often 
                                                12Team manager like in American baseball is the head coach. 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filled with a certain amount of resentment on the part of the players because of these rules 
of conduct off the field.  It is these rules that make their lives after practice feel boring. 
Maintaining Human Capital Through Medical Services 
In addition to coaching staff, the club hires medical staff to treat player injuries 
and attend to their overall health.  Club staff are investments in human capital for teams 
as they improve use-values and maintain the product.  Clubs in Egypt, however, pay little 
attention to the psychological needs and social health of their players.   
Becker distinguishes outside job investments as mostly physical and emotional 
health, which is just as important to increasing the output of the workforce as on the job 
investments such as job trainings.   
A decline in the death rate of working ages may improve earning prospects by 
extending the period during which earnings are received; a better diet adds 
strength and stamina, and thus earning capacity; or an improvement in working 
conditions-higher wages, coffee breaks, and so on-may affect morale and 
productivity (Becker 1975:40-41).   
Healthcare is just as important within the football industry as training.  Without 
physically agile bodies, the clubs are unable to compete and thus unable produce their 
product.   
Regrettably, football clubs in Egypt do not perceive emotional health as an 
important determinant of productivity and wage determination.  The most evident 
example of this for African football players in Egypt is club restrictions on their social 
lives, including interaction with women.  This subject of limiting interactions with the 
opposite sex is thoroughly addressed in the next chapter, but needs to be understood here 
in the context of psychological health coupled with the lack of nurturing social lives of 
players.    
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 Limitations on interactions with women coupled with a lack of a nurturing social 
life affects the happiness of the individual players and judging by what my interviewees 
told me, is an impediment to the use-value of the player as a commodity.  It would be 
misleading to say that these restrictions on these player’s lives are solely the result of the 
club’s disciplinary code.  They are also reflective of Egyptian cultural norms that player 
would encounter without the surveillance of football clubs.  My interviewees perceive 
these club and cultural restrictions as hurtful to their productivity.  Fred describes below 
the negative impact of club restrictions: 
They [management] want you to concentrate on football all the time; you cannot 
just live like that…  I go home from training. You cannot go anywhere; we do not 
have anyplace to go.  I do not have much of a social life. To become the best 
player you need to be happy, their culture we do not like it. You cannot talk to a 
woman; you cannot date a woman because the culture limits you from interacting 
with them.  They cannot expect you to play well all the time if you are unhappy 
and you cannot even be in a relationship. 
Perhaps one of the most common themes among contracted football players is the lack of 
a social life.  Even though they admit to having friends, they also admit to not socializing 
often.  Paul and Maleek during their interview told me they do not hang out with friends 
often.  They spend the majority of their free time at home on the computer or watching 
football matches.  Martin complained that he and others have nowhere else to go but 
home, that there is “no chilling place.”  Other African players complained of a lack of 
public space where they can socialize and hang out.  Charles states: “I go to practice.  
After practice, I stay at home because I do not know where to go.  I watch television and 
chat with friends.  Anytime I am free and there is a game, I watch it.”  When I asked 
Charles, what he thought of Egypt, he hesitated and then replied: “It is a good place to 
live, but you never leave your home because it is not your country…In Nigeria, I do not 
stay home and I go out in my country everything is free for me.”  Football players change 
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their behavior in Egypt in order to adapt.  Their change in lifestyle is an investment in 
human capital because it prevents them from being fined.  Yet this change in lifestyle and 
control has psychological implications that they feel degrades their human capital. 
Surplus Value: Commodification and Labor Trade Markets 
 
“The agents make moves you have to work hard here to move on. Manager wants 
to sign me to stay here to trade me. They we want me to stay in Egypt.” –Paul, 
country withheld 
David Beckham and Thierry Henry accepted large figure contracts at the end of 
their careers in clubs in a rather obscure football league from a European perspective.  
Major League Soccer (MLS) in the United States with the aid of sports giants such as 
Nike and Adidas have started to import star labor from Europe in hopes of drawing 
attention to football in the United States.  Both Beckham and Henry have had long 
successful club and national team careers.  Their bodies are worth millions of dollars in 
terms of endorsement deals, use-value, exchange-value, and salary.  They are not just 
human beings, but have become brands.  Clubs, companies, and these players willingly 
commodify these two bodies in exchange for monetary reward.   Commodification is the 
process by which something such as an object or even a person is given certain values 
that makes it become a commodity.  Many times the commodification of the human body 
through economic exchanges is masked as something else through social constructions 
such as endorsement deals (Scheper-Hughes 2002:2).  The body becomes a tradable, 
stolen, and sold object that can be divided into parts, for instance the black market sales 
of kidneys (Scheper-Hughes 2002:1). 
The commodification of the football players exists through the economic 
organization of global professional football.  The players are not only human resources, 
but also an investment in financial capital for football clubs.  The quality of a player’s 
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performance determines his monetary exchange-value through speculations.  The player’s 
price becomes real when the under-contract player is transferred to another team: “When 
this occurs, the buyer club has to pay an indemnity to the seller one” (Poli 2005:2).  The 
player thus becomes a commodity when exchanged between clubs.   
As referenced multiple times in this thesis the changes in FIFA legislation during 
the 1980s and the Bosman ruling in 1995 created vast changes to global football industry.  
The most important legislation in context of commodification was the Bosman ruling that 
created free agency for players in Europe.  Free agency has actually allowed for sub-
Saharan football players to be less commodified in this sense than they used to be.  
Before the Bosman ruling and introductions of free-agency within other football 
associations, football clubs maintained rights to players even after their contract had 
expired.  Players were forced to negotiate a new contract with their former club or find a 
team willing to pay an indemnity after their contract had finished.  With the introduction 
of free agency, clubs no longer have any rights to football players after a contract has 
expired.  These changes facilitated mobility and migration of football labor.  Yet 
indemnities still remain if players are under contract.  Often it is not in the interest of a 
football club to wait till a player’s contract has finished to hire an individual.  Football is 
a business that depends on agile fit labor at all moments.  A club will pay indemnities for 
players because they will provide the skill and potential they need and perhaps the star 
power, which may no longer be at its peak if they wait until the contract has expired.  As 
said recently players are economic and competitive investments.  A competitive 
successful club will experience hirer economic reward by attracting more fans and 
commercial income that comes with a larger fan base and success in competition.  
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A contract on average lasts two years or two league seasons when a sub-Saharan 
player signs with an Egyptian team.  The players who have played for multiple teams in 
Egypt also have had contracts lasting two years with each team.  I have not heard of any 
contracts lasting less than two years in Egypt.  Yet there are reports within the media of 
longer contracts negotiated between players and clubs such as Edet Otobong who 
reportedly signed a four-year contract with Ittihad (African Soccer Union 2010:1).   A 
player is more likely to be traded or “bought” when they are peaking in their performance 
because they have a higher exchange-value, which will motivate a club to part with a 
certain player.  Yet the quality or greatness needed in a player’s peak is circumstantial 
based on where they are playing and where the interested club is also located within the 
global economic system.  Manchester United competes within a highly developed league 
and the core of the industry. The club can afford to employ the top players from around 
the world whereas Ahly does not have the capital to employ a similar player.  Therefore 
the players, Ahly would “buy” have most likely a less developed skill-set than a player 
being “bought” by Manchester United.  Though this player might have peaked in some 
senses, they are not as skilled as a player employed by Manchester United.  Ahly’s player 
has the chance to be as skilled in the future, but when “bought” or sign by Ahly, he does 
not. 
As demonstrated in the previous chapter, for a player to move between clubs, it is 
a complex process that involves a lot of intermediaries negotiating on the players behalf 
and between the two respected clubs.   From what I observed from player movement 
within Egypt as well as in and out of Egypt, for a player to be “bought,” there has to be a 
sizable indemnity paid to the player’s club.  The new standout players usually garner 
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interest from multiple clubs, which allows for his club to hold out for the highest 
indemnity possible.  If the club believes they are able to obtain a larger indemnity than 
offered, they will wait, which almost creates a bidding war over the player.   
These indemnities also known as transfer fees are not as high as European 
records, but they are still significant amounts of capital especially when compared to the 
average salaries in Egypt and the world.  Manchester United traded to Real Madrid 
Portuguese player Cristiano Ronaldo for a world record of eighty-million British Sterling 
(Wilson 2009:1).  To give an idea of indemnities within, to, and from Egypt, I will share 
some of the transfer fees quoted from the press.  Cameroonian Edet Otobong was 
transferred from a club in Syria for $300,000 to the Egyptian Premier League club, 
Ittihad.  In his first season he earned a salary of $80,000 (African Soccer Union 2010a:1).  
By mid season of the 2010-2011 Egyptian Cup, he had the second highest number of 
points in the league.  His success drew attention from multiple football suitors including 
Ismaily who made a formal offer, which Ittihad rejected.  In June 2011, Ittihad traded 
Otobong to a Sudanese team, Al Hilal for a reported $841,000 (Farouk 2011:1).  
According to Ahmed Morsey (2008), Wigan Athletic a British football club offered 
Zamalek FC a considerable amount of money for Egyptian player Amr Zaki in 2008: 
Wigan will pay a loan fee of 1,250,000 Euros plus 400,000 Euros with an option 
to sign the player at the end of the loan period for an agreed transfer fee less than 
the amount already paid by Wigan to Zamalek. The English club also agreed to 
pay 500,000 to Zamalek if the player scores 10 Premier League goals for Wigan 
during the loan spell (1). 
Probably the most beloved Egyptian goalie, Essam Al Hadary was traded from Zamalek 
to a club in Khartoum, Sudan for $700,000 in late 2010 (MTN Football 2010:1).  
Hadary’s migration is unique in that he travels from the semi-periphery to the periphery. 
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In exchange for indemnity paid to their home club, Mouctar, Paul, Napoleon, 
Charles, and Castro were transferred to various Egyptian clubs.  Castro and the others had 
no control over whether their team and the Egyptian club would come to an agreement.  
Castro’s Egyptian club paid an indemnity or as Castro explained that the club “bought” 
him.  
It is through the transaction.  There was someone.  There were a couple of guys. 
Um I met someone who called me from Ghana.  Someone called me from Ghana.  
He told me about a team he had in Egypt and if I was interested.  The football 
there [in Egypt] is a certain higher level so. 
As he signed a new contract, be became subject the new club’s control over movement, 
which can keep him in Egypt longer than he would want.  Players who did not go through 
this process when signing with an Egyptian team will be subject to it while under 
contract. 
All the African football players I interviewed in Egypt except Martin want to play 
in Europe, and several have received offers or interest, but their contracts to Egyptian 
clubs often prevent them from fulfilling their dream of playing in Europe.  As long as 
players maintain contracts with Egyptian clubs, it is the club’s decision on whether 
trading or loaning a particular player to a European club or elsewhere is in the best 
interest of the club.  It is only after the approval of their club that a player may accept the 
offer of a club in Europe.  Zinedine explains below the rights of the club has over a 
player: 
Well, if I have a contract here, I cannot quit my contract and go to Europe to play.  
It is not good because when I do that, I risk them following me.  My club here 
would leave to locate me in another club in Europe.  So it is a problem … so it 
will sanction me.  I can runaway.  I quit my club and I leave but it is not for 
playing...  If I stay there in Europe, I do not play anymore.  I do other things, but 
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one time that I play, my name is immediate.  Everyone knows me now.  My club 
here [in Egypt] is going to say that we know this player here, it is my player.13 
What Zinedine does not explain is the penalty of breaking FIFA rules if players break 
contract with a club to play on another.  FIFA ordered Egyptian National goalie Essam Al 
Hadary and Swiss club FC Sion to pay a fine of $796,500 to Ahly in Egypt because FIFA 
found that Al Hadary’s move to Switzerland had broken FIFA regulations (Abd El 
Rasoul 2011:1).   
In the case of one player, he was unable to leave his club in Egypt because his 
club and a club in Argentina were unable to come to an agreement on trade fees.  He 
explained that ultimately the Egyptian club has the most control over where he goes as 
long as he is under contract with them.   
I have to decide to go to Argentina.  It depends on the relationship between the 
clubs.  I have had other offers to play elsewhere, including in Holland and 
Belgium.  The club has a lot of control where I go.  They have the most control 
because you have a contract with them so they will decide if it is no good for 
them than they say no, or if they need your service more than they will say no. 
That is what happened to most of time.  My contracts are every two years.  
What makes football players a unique commodity is that their status as a commodity is 
dependent upon their employment.  Commodities have a fluid commodity-value that 
changes based on multiple circumstances, yet it usually always continues to have some 
form of value.  To have a commodity-value, a sub-Saharan football player has to be 
under contract with a team during a transfer window.  A club is only responsible for 
paying an indemnity to the player’s previous team if a player is under contract.  In 
contrast, a free agent is someone without contractual obligations to any football club.  
                                                
13 Original quote in French: Bon, si j’ai une contrat ici, je peux pas quitter mon contrat et partir en Europe à 
jouer.  C’est pas bon parce que quand je fait ça Il risque de me suivre.  Mon club ici va partir me chercher 
dans un autre club en Europe.  Donc c’est un problème...    Donc Il va me sanctionner. Tu comprends ?    Je 
peux fuir, je quitte mon club et je pars  mais ce n’est pas pour jouer. Je ne peux pas. Si je reste là bas en 
Europe Je ne joue plus.    Je fait autre chose, mais une fois que je joue,  mon nom est immédiatement.  Tout 
le monde me connais maintenant mon club ici va dire on connais le joueur-là c’est mon jouer.  
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Thus a free agent has no commodity-value and cannot be bought as Castro was quoted 
saying in the introduction of this thesis.  Despite the fact that a player loses his 
commodity-value when becoming a free-agent, football players are still commodities 
because the most valuable players are likely to have contracts that span their most 
valuable years such as Edet Otobong who had a four year contract with Ittihad when he 
started to break out and increase his commodity-value.   A player’s value to the club 
actually corresponds to the transfer-value during this period of high success. 
To avoid Egyptian club management, Mohammed, an agent I interviewed, moves 
his players to Europe after their contract finishes.  He normally waits till the contract 
becomes expired to secure their departure abroad more easily.  Therefore, the clubs 
cannot profit from the transaction and thus have no say on whether the player will travel 
abroad or not.  These contracts make players unique commodities because the player only 
retains a commodity-value while under contract, which usually lasts between two to four 
years.  Upon the completion of a contract, a player can negotiate a new contract with their 
existing club or another organization. 
Players are also traded within the Egyptian football industry.  Egypt not only 
serves as a nodal point between home and Europe or elsewhere in Napoleon’s case, but 
also has its own interior football labor trade market.  About four of the players I 
interviewed have played on at least two teams in Egypt.  It maintains its own hierarchy 
that foreign players can scale in order to reach better contracts, including those in Europe.  
Players that excel in the second tier teams can be traded up to the Premier League.  They 
also have opportunities through relegation and promotion to move up to the Premier 
League with their club at the same time.  Like transactions with European clubs, contracts 
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with buy-out clauses force clubs seeking the player to pay an indemnity to his current 
football club.   Despite the fact that football players are less commodified than they used 
to be, football teams continue to see them as commodities.  Mohammed told me that 
because he moves his clients abroad, he does not have a good rapport with club teams in 
Egypt: “I am not in a good relation with teams here [in Egypt] because I take their 
players.”  He went on to explain that it is harder to work within the Egyptian football 
labor trade market because managers view him as a threat to the stability of their teams 
due to his work within the international trade market.  Also as previously stated 
Mohammed purposely tries to move players after their contract expires, which means the 
previous club loses out on income from a transfer fee.  The fact that team managers hold 
grudges against Mohammed demonstrates that clubs continue to view players as 
commodities.   
The fact that players are viewed as commodities is indicative in the lexicon used 
by players to describe the process of contractual trade negotiations between clubs.  As 
referenced in the introduction of this thesis, Castro described football players as being 
bought: “Some of the coaches, they look at your CVs and your DVDs and then they 
invite you for a try-out…Some of them look at it and they buy you straight away.”  
Football players are more “bought” than they have been in the past because as mentioned 
in the previous chapter and the introduction of this thesis, regulations implemented by 
FIFA and the European Union coupled with sports agents who took advantage of these 
new rulings, football labor migration has gradually increased since the 1980s and in the 
mid-1990s, the European football industry experienced an imported football labor boom.   
Perhaps, the commodification and neoliberalization of football has led such terms as 
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“bought” to be adopted into people’s everyday speech.  However as there is no previous 
literature to contrast this linguistic pattern with and players have previously been bought 
and traded (just not as frequent today) prior to neoliberalism, it can only be hypothesized 
that perhaps neoliberalism’s tendency to put everything in terms of market transactions 
has lead players like Castro to adopt economic expressions within their vocabulary. 
In addition to lexicon and reactions to player movement, is the objectification of 
the players.  Inherent in the act of commodification is objectification and subject making 
of players through control mechanisms such as surveillance, which are used to control the 
players into behaving in certain way that is acceptable by the clubs and Egyptian cultural 
practices.  These mechanisms of control are discussed in the next chapter. 
Conclusion 
 
Football clubs and football agents actively invest in human capital.  These investments 
are a means of creating a better player that is more profitable monetarily and performs 
better physically on the field.  Within the periphery and semi-periphery, football 
industries serve as locales of talent development that feed more profitable markets in 
Europe.  However this labor distribution can also been seen between the periphery and 
the semi-periphery as in the case of Egypt.  The football labor transfer market allows 
these clubs to recoup investments and potentially profit from the creation of surplus value 
upon trading the player.  According to FIFA’s formal rules players are treated more as 
free agents and less as commodities.  Yet players are still objectified by clubs through 
controlling mechanisms.  In the next chapter, I discuss disciplinary measures used by 
Egyptian clubs to control and shape player behavior in relation to Foucault’s definition of 
objectification, subjectivity, and his theory of discipline and punish.   
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5. Dominance and Objectification: Club 
Rules 
 
All the African players I interviewed had severely limited social lives due to 
stringent club rules.  Of all the players I met, Henry’s life was the most controlled and 
restricted.  He told me that he could be fined for meeting with me not because I was a 
researcher, but because I was not his wife; he was forbidden from having interactions 
with me or other women.  When I apologized for putting him at risk of punishment by his 
team manager14, he quickly replied that I had no need to apologize and that I had made 
his week.  I was a complete change from his lack of social life.  He tended to stay at 
home when he was not at work.  Other times Henry just rode the metro alone to explore 
Cairo to pass the time.  He was so restricted by his manager that he was unable to enter 
certain public spaces, such as restaurants or concert venues, where he could have been 
“seen.” He had to be careful of what public spaces he engaged in his everyday life.  Other 
players like Martin are subject to certain rules of conduct set by the team manager.  They 
are also subject to disciplinary punishment if they break these rules.   
I interpret the discipline of players as a form of objectification.  Despite the fact 
that the neoliberal agenda has actually reduced a player’s formal regulated 
commodification, the institution of the Egyptian club has not reduced his objectification.  
The neoliberal reforms that have given African players more individual freedom in their 
choices to choose employers as free agents do not correlate to the amount of individual 
                                                14 In football discursive tradition, the manager is what in American football lexicocv 
n would mean a coach.  The manger is responsible for deciding the team line up, and setting disciplinary 
rules, and running team practices.  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freedom a player experiences in their private life in Egypt.  Neoliberalism appears to 
promote individual freedom, but in reality it is pro-business and tends to give priority to 
corporations over individuals because business provides the capital individuals earn and 
consume. The player’s loss of a commodity-value upon the expiration of their contract 
has not changed the way clubs view players in Egypt.  I cannot argue that neoliberalism 
is completely responsible for the objectification of these players since there is precedent 
for controlling treatment in other leagues and professional sports.  What can be said is 
that despite regulation that afforded football players more rights to their choice of 
employer, club management still perceives their players as objects and commodities, but 
within a different economic situation in addition to a cultural situation that makes Egypt 
unique in its subjectification.  This situation is representative of the tension between 
neoliberalism hypocritical stance on individual freedom and pro-business ideology. 
This chapter draws upon Foucault’s (1994) understanding of subject formation 
through objectification.  The word “subject” has two meanings according to Foucault; a 
person that is “subject to someone else by control and dependence, and tied to his own 
identity by conscience or self-knowledge” (Foucault 1994:331).   Subjectivity is 
inseparable from regimes of power.  Being subject to a club in Egypt and a global 
neoliberal regime creates a unique subjective experience for sub-Saharan players in 
Egypt and Africa.  This chapter explores a player’s subjective experience and 
objectification in relation to club rules and dominance in formulating their subjectivity.  
Sub-Saharan football players are subject to club management through a system of 
controlling surveillance and “unequal gaze” in alignment with Foucault’s (1995) 
interpretation of the panopticon within his book Discipline and Punish.  Players like 
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Martin are forced to adapt their personality and lifestyle to meet the manager’s 
expectations.  They are dependent upon their manager for approval and income, and are 
controlled by him through disciplinary techniques.  This chapter theorizes that the 
institution of the club objectifies sub-Saharan football players by transforming them into 
subjects through discipline and surveillance. 
Power, Coaching Staff, and Subjectification 
 
 Kelly and Waddington’s (2006) research on football managerial disciplinary 
measures relied upon Max Weber’s (1964) understanding of three forms of authority: 
traditional, rational legal, and bureaucratic.  They describe football manger’s exercise of 
authority as an instance of what Weber called traditional authority, meaning a club 
manager is not limited by a set of consistent rules, as someone exercising bureaucratic 
authority would be.  As its name suggests, traditions partially encompass traditional 
authority, which “define the context of commands and the objects and extent of 
authority…Secondly, tradition leaves a certain sphere of action open for the leader’s free 
personal decision” (Kelly and Waddington 2006:159).  In contrast to Kelly and 
Waddington, I am looking at how these clubs and the club managers objectify players.  I 
perceive the power and control of a manager as an institutionalized power that objectifies 
players. 
Objectification that exists in everyday life is a form of power that creates the 
subject. Human beings are transformed into subjects by two different modes of 
objectification as Foucault explains below: 
This form of power that applies itself to immediate everyday life categorizes the 
individual marks him by his own individuality, attaches him to his own identity, 
imposes a law of truth on him that he must recognize and others have to recognize 
in him.  It is a form of power that makes individuals subjects.  There are two 
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meanings of the word ‘subject’: subject to someone else by control and 
dependence, and tied to his own identity by a conscience or self-knowledge.  Both 
meanings suggest a form of power that subjugates and makes subject to (Foucault 
1994:331). 
 
Sub-Saharan players are subject to a manager and clubs rules through control and 
dependence.  Players’ experiences of subjectivity are inseparable from the regimes of 
power and knowledge such as club institutions that shape, enable, and restrict them.   To 
understand how they are subjectified, one must first examine clubs rules and methods of 
discipline.  
Club Rules 
  
You must not go to clubs.  You must not flirt with sluts.  You must not go to the 
press.15 –Mouctar, Côte d’Ivoire  
 
There is punishment if you are late.  Sometimes they fine you.  We cannot talk to 
the media and must have affiliation with the Egyptian federation. – Fred, Ghana 
 
In the quotations above, Mouctar and Fred explain the general rules that they must 
follow to be in good stead with the manager and club officials.  These rules include no 
tardiness, do not talk to the press, do not flirt with women, and do not go with clubs and 
other varying venues. The rules create spatial dichotomies that are circumstantial based 
on the presence of certain types of bodies, such as women and journalists.  For instance, 
going to a café with your male friend is acceptable, but going with a female who is not 
your wife is unacceptable.  Certainly your home also contains restrictions whereby 
female bodies are also prohibited.  Managers also designate certain spaces off limits; the 
most prominent, at least in the minds of football players, are dance clubs, which exist in 
                                                
15Original quote in French: “Il ne faut pas aller en boïte. Il ne faut pas flirter avec des pûtes.  Il ne faut pas 
aller au presse.”   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multiple forms in Cairo.  From upper class, trendy expensive hot-spots to old downtown 
belly dancing bars to Africana where a large number of Black Africans and a curious 
foreign expat population dance until the early hours of the morning.  These spaces are 
perceived negatively by management, thus forbidden because they contain alcohol, single 
women, and in some cases prostitutes.  Other locations, such as modern concert venues 
have also been designated as off limits in some cases.   Interaction between women and 
football players are restricted within team functions and player’s social lives in Egypt. 
Limitations on Interactions with Women 
 
What stands Egypt apart from previous research on managerial control and other 
leagues is the lengths at which clubs attempt to prevent socialization and interaction with 
female bodies.  This is not only a reflection of the fear of female sexuality, but also 
reflexive of the Egyptian cultural context that differentiates it from other sports leagues. 
The female body and sexuality has long been seen as having a corrupting and tarnishing 
power over men.  Sport is a clear example.  As recently as the 2010 World Cup, the 
British Press reported that Spanish fans had blamed Sara Carbonero, sportscaster for the 
television station Telecinco, for Spain’s upsetting loss to Switzerland during the group 
stage of the World Cup finals (Mackey 2010:1).  The Guardian reported that Carbonero, 
the girlfriend of Spanish goalkeeper Iker Casillas, distracted Casillas by her presence on 
the football pitch.  Furthermore, the Guardian explained that Spanish fans feared she 
would distract the team before the 2010 World Cup had begun.  Her presence and beauty 
were claimed to have destabilized the team (Ashdown 2010:1).  Graham Keeley of the 
Times of London stated that Carbonero “has been voted sexiest journalist in the world. It 
was she, the fans insisted, who had sapped the strength of Spain’s goalkeeper and caused 
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him to fluff what seemed an easy shot” (Mackey 2010:1).  She later replied that these 
reports were nonsense.  The Spanish press also criticized the British press for reporting 
such fallacy, claiming that the British media had not substantiated its claims with verified 
evidence that fans were upset at Carbonero (Mackey 2010:1). 
 Among teams from various parts of the world, the fear of women’s sexuality 
tainting the game of football and other sports has long been ritualized during the pre-
match team retreat to the team’s hotel.  The superstition excludes women from pre-game 
ritual in order to prevent their sexuality from “polluting” the team (Armstrong and 
Giulianotti 1997:10).  This also occurs in other sports in prevention of female 
contamination (Caudwell 2009:267).  Mary Douglas explained that discourses about 
sexual danger and pollution usually include male endangerment by females: 
There are beliefs that each sex is a danger to the other through contact with sexual 
fluids. According to other beliefs only one sex is endangered by contact with the 
other, usually males from females . . . Such patterns of sexual danger can be seen 
to express symmetry or hierarchy. It is implausible to interpret them as expressing 
something about actual relations of the sexes. I suggest that many ideas about 
sexual dangers are better interpreted as symbols of the relation between parts of 
society, as mirroring designs of hierarchy or symmetry, which apply in the larger 
social system. (1966:14) 
 
Like in European football and professional sports teams in the United States, Egyptian 
football teams also have the pre-game ritual, which requires the entire team retreating to a 
hotel for the night.  On the day prior to game day, a player wakes early to go to practice 
and an intense day of game preparation.  The team then travels to the hotel, which they 
call “camp.”  The hotel can be in the city where the match is or their home base.  One 
Cairo team goes to a hotel in Ain Sokna, a Red-Sea resort for Egypt’s elite an hour 
outside of Cairo when competing in Cairo.  Once arriving at the hotel, the team has 
dinner together at the hotel.  Afterwards, the team reviews team videos of their own and 
 101 
of the opposing team in order analyze their offensive and defensive objectives.  They are 
restricted to their rooms by a set time.  For Napoleon, the pre-game hotel ritual takes 
place in this order: 
Yeah we stay in a hotel when we have the match, we have to be there at seven 
o’clock we have dinner.  We have a meeting at ten to watch videos about the 
team.  At eleven everyone has to be in their room. By midnight you have to be 
asleep; you cannot watch television.  They come and take your phones.  
A member of the management staff always collects the cell phones of all the players.  To 
get around this rule, Napoleon maintains two phones: 
Because when you go to camp they take the phones from us, so they come to our 
rooms around eleven during camp to take the phones from us. They say we will 
not sleep we will talk on our phones to our girlfriends and wives if they do not 
take the phones away.  So I have two phones, I give them one phone and keep the 
other one.  
After taking their phones, management goes around to the hotel rooms to make sure the 
lights and televisions are off.  This basically forces the players to sleep because they have 
nothing else to do.   
Restrictions on the interaction of football players with women are also exist 
outside of club activities in Egypt.  Exceptions are applied to married football players.  
According to the players I interviewed, Egyptian football teams do support married 
African football players and help obtain the necessary resident visas for the player’s wife 
to live in Egypt.  Clubs encourage married players to bring their wives to Egypt; 
however, no one I interviewed was married.  Sports clubs discourage if not actively 
prohibit single males from interaction with women because they are not married.  As 
Mary Douglas was quoted earlier, patterns of sexual danger in Egypt are symbolic of 
hierarchy and conformity within Egyptian culture.  Egyptian club teams’ restrictions on 
players’ interactions with women play on multiple discourses about marriage, 
relationships, sexuality in Egypt, and African male sexuality.   
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Many players cannot go out clubbing or go to parties and could be fined by their 
club if caught.  Interaction with women outside of these spaces is also restricted, 
especially within their home.  Henry described to me how he had invited a fellow African 
player and his wife over to his house to watch a football game on television soon after he 
had signed a contract with his club. Once he reported to the next practice, he was accused 
of having sex with the woman, who was African as well.  The team doctor and coach 
blamed the player’s groin injury on him having too much sex and not over exertion on the 
field.  Henry describes this moment as “when all the problems started.”  He further 
elaborated that the club prevents him from doing many things on his personal time.   
You are not allowed to be seen with any females unless you are married. It is 
weird. I cannot go to clubs or dancing.  I feel very much controlled by the club; it 
doesn’t help my football. My club and coach are very strict. Some Egyptian 
teammates of mine just wanted to go to a party, someone tattled on them to the 
coach and management.  The club then seized their salary for the month. 
 
Henry believes the boweb (doorman) and his roommates who are also his 
teammates, spy on him and other teammates in the building.  He told me that people pay 
attention to the time the players come and go as well as where they go.  Teammates are 
always gossiping about each other.  Privacy, he says, is hard to find.  Other players have 
described this issue, and to avoid some of these complications they choose to live outside 
of the neighborhood they play in order to have more “freedom.”  
Henry’s experience of having his heterosexuality blamed for his injuries was 
symbolic of not only the idea that a women’s sexuality will pollute and endanger the 
football player, but discourses about African males’ heterosexual activities.  African 
males are stereotyped as over sexual.  Therefore, in order to protect these men from the 
tarnishing sexuality of women, they must be restricted from female interaction.  The 
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football manager regulates space through the creation of rules, which limit the spatial 
areas that the player can navigate such as dance clubs where interactions with woman are 
greater.  Each manager has his own rules, which vary in severity; yet, there are three 
common themes.  Mouctar explained them, as “you must not go to clubs.  You must not 
flirt with sluts.  You must not go to the press.”16   
In comparison to a player’s home country, where pre-martial sex is more 
accepted, Egypt has many social rules that seek to prevent pre-martial sex.  African 
football players are largely sexually frustrated and find this frustration a motivation to not 
continue playing in Egypt.  As Henry voiced “I want to leave as soon as possible after the 
season is over because of the culture.  It is different, direct opposite and direct opposite of 
football culture in Europe.  You are not allowed to be seen with any females unless you 
are married. It is weird. I cannot go to clubs or dancing.”  Many times when the players 
voice frustration, they tend to make comparisons to Europe, as if they had been there and 
are experts on European culture and football.  They compare European culture and 
football with their Egyptian counterparts and object to the later as Henry did above.   
Players describe the lack of interactions with women as having negative effects on 
their ability to play.  As discussed earlier in chapter four, this is the complete opposite of 
a manager’s position in trying to prevent and limit female interaction in order to avoid the 
polluting female sexuality and preserve Egyptian cultural norms.  African players believe 
sexual frustration will eventually affect their ability to play because it leads to 
unhappiness.  Fred voiced his frustration: 
                                                
16Original quote in French: “Il ne faut pas aller en boïte. Il ne faut pas flirter avec des pûtes.  Il ne faut pas 
aller au presse.”   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They [management] want you to concentrate on football all the time; you cannot 
just live like that…  I go home from training. You cannot go anywhere; we do not 
have anyplace to go.  I do not have much of a social life. To become the best 
player you need to be happy, their culture we do not like it. You cannot talk to a 
woman; you cannot date a woman because the culture limits you from interacting 
with them.  They cannot expect you to play well all the time if you are unhappy 
and you cannot even be in a relationship. 
 
Castro elaborates further the understanding that a “happy” player will play well and an 
unhappy player will not.  Castro explained that you are given more “space” in Ghana to 
do things on your personal time.  Space signifies two things. First, space is a negotiable 
physical space.  Second, space as Bourdieu defined the social structure in which people 
navigate and struggle with a complex set of objective and subjective social relations 
(1989:17).  In contrast to Ghana, Castro explains below how Egypt differs: 
In Egypt, um… they like sometimes they make life difficult for we the foreigners 
because you know um footballers are making gym now.  We have certain type of 
life that we live. There are players that they can stay at home not do anything and 
they will not be happy and they will not be able to play.  Players that go out and 
have fun and they will be happy and on the field they will play. The mentality in 
Egypt has to change a little bit where players can get freedom to move around 
freedom to have fun and play. If they are not playing than it is different, but here 
you can even go, they don’t want to see you at the nightclubs.  They don’t want to 
see you at the nightclub. They don’t want to see you drinking. 
 
Nightclubs are usually mentioned while talking about women.  Many of the players are 
not allowed to go to nightclubs, which they find frustrating and depressing.  They enjoy 
going out and dancing.  A player ultimately feels that he is unhappy because of the rules 
set by his manager, he feels that it affects his performance negatively. 
The preservation of Egyptian cultural norms relate to the restrictions sub-Saharan 
players feel and experience. The rules are reflective of cultural norms that players would 
encounter without the surveillance of football clubs. Nonetheless, my interviewees 
perceive these club and cultural restrictions as hurtful to their productivity as football 
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players.  In Egypt, the ideal woman maintains purity and virginity until marriage, which 
upholds her and her family’s honor.  In general, Egyptian society maintains gender 
segregation; however, there are many pockets where the lines are blurred. You can find 
young unmarried couples by the Nile and in cafes in the early evening.  As the evening 
goes on the number of single women out and about on the street without a male relative is 
low.  Pre-marital sex does happen in Egypt, yet it is taboo and socially unacceptable.  
African players perceive Egyptian restrictions on interactions with women as restrictive 
to themselves.  Ricky explains “you cannot talk to a women, you cannot date a woman 
because the culture limits you from interacting with them.”  Common cultural discourse 
or space creates the ideal relationship between men and women, which have a direct 
affect on an African player’s lifestyle and interaction with women.   
There is a common explanation among footballers that “they [Egyptians]” say 
“no” to multiple habits because it is against Egyptian culture as if Egyptian culture is 
absolute.   Napoleon explains: “In Ghana you can wear any clothes on the street; here I 
cannot.  You cannot have a girlfriend or kiss her on the streets unlike in Ghana. So here 
they will say no.  Also you cannot wear any sleeveless, even in summer time.  They say 
no.”  In another interview, Martin further expands upon this: “It is kind a station 
everything goes about. I mean the culture is not by law the culture. Everything you do if 
we did it wrong the way they would say no it is against our culture.  Not their law, 
everything.” 
  The rules are a way of disciplining football players into behaving as the 
institution deems appropriate.  These rules make a player subject to a club’s managerial 
expectations or else they will be punished mostly through fining.  In order to enforce 
 106 
these rules, clubs use surveillance and punishment.  What happens when you break these 
rules is outlined below.  
Punishment 
 
  When a player misbehaves and breaks a rule, the manager fines him.  Monetary 
fining is a universal method of discipline and punishment by the clubs in Europe and 
Egypt alike. Tardiness to practice and events is almost a universally fined offense in 
Europe.  Timeliness is required in most occupations; however, most employers outside of 
the football industry do not fine tardiness (Kelly and Waddington 2006:155).  Fining is a 
method of disciplining employees to behave in a certain way.  During the factory era of 
the 19th century in Britain, factory owners fined their late employees to control their 
behavior.  Today, although most other industries have replaced fines for repeated 
tardiness with a warning system, the football industry has conserved them (Kelly and 
Waddington 2006:155). 
Fines are the primary form of punishment in Egyptian football clubs.  The rules 
set by the manager are usually brought forth in the contract negotiations and explained 
prior to any signatures.  Fred explains that these rules are not negotiable and fines are 
implemented for offenses other than just tardiness: “before you a sign a contract, they set 
rules to live by and they will take away money if you break those rules.  They give you 
half your salary at the beginning and then they will give you another 50% after the 
games.  If the team does not do well, they will take away money.” 
As Fred highlighted, in Egypt you can be punished monetarily for not performing 
well.  Because of the football industry’s increasing corporatization and 
commercialization (Bourdieu 1998), clubs under immense pressure not to fail or under 
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perform as they lose sponsorship money and potential fans.  There are other forms of 
punishment beyond fines, which Martin elaborates below: 
Here the signs of the football, signs, I mean the way they understood football.  
The white football, in their culture or in their perception is you have to win you 
don’t need to lose. Here [in Egypt] you have to win you must win you must. If 
you lose there is a lot of badding [sic] on you. Reaction, punishment [is] direct 
[and] indirect, all of these are some things [they do to punish us]. 
 
To clarify direct and indirect punishment are ways in which clubs demonstrate anger and 
seek revenge for bad performance.  Clubs will use methods to indirectly or passively 
punish the players like delaying the salary, as Martin explains: 
They will delay it [pay check], but they will say uh… they will tell you they are 
not [to] blame for it. They are processing it.  They are processing it. But if you 
compare it to the previous month, you will see that no they are not processing it 
because at the end of each month on the 27th they will put your money in your 
account. But compared to this month they will put your money on the next month 
in the first week, but if you ask them they will say that we are [just] processing it.   
 
In 2009, a former Zamalek player, Junior Agogo from Ghana, claimed that Zamelek had 
failed to pay him his salary during the previous five months.  He then chose to break his 
contract (Footylatest 2009:1).  Agogo butted heads with Zamalek management after 
being traded from Nottingham Forest in England for Zamelek’s Amir Zaky (Footylatest 
2009:1; Brown 2008:1).  Agogo claimed to the press that: 
For the past five months I was not paid, I was fined US$200,000 for no crime and 
all these were not even written down in a letter to me. I stayed on because I 
thought things might improve but it didn’t… The injustice being meted out 
against me grew by the day and therefore I decided to report the issue to FIFA to 
seek redress. Under the current climate if I stayed here whilst taking action 
against the club my life could be at risk so I decided to leave and to press charges 
against the club at FIFA (Footylatest 2008:1). 
 
Both Castro and Martin also claimed that Zamalek fans had attacked Agogo in 
retaliation for his bad performance, but I found nothing to back up this claim.  Physical 
assault against players by football fans in Egypt is not uncommon; Ultras fans have 
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previously admitted to it, which is a discussed later in this chapter.  Agogo obviously 
feared some form of backlash from Zamalek fans because he felt he needed to leave the 
country in order to protect himself while filing complaints with FIFA.  Agogo mentions 
fining which is a direct form of punishment.  Coincidently while I was researching him, 
during a phone conversation with Thomas, he started laughing randomly in reaction to 
the people on the street who kept calling him Agogo.  Whether it is his unique name or 
his reputation, Agogo definitely remains in Egyptian memory.   
Other forms of punishment include neglect, as Martin explains: “The direct one is 
coming on the pitch, they will neglect you, the neglection [sic], they neglect you. 
Emotionally, they will cut you off.  Even if you ask them something, we don’t know or 
wait after.  You will see it on their face when it is direct.”  Though Martin’s explanation 
is understated and to me the staff comes across as passive-aggressive, Managers do 
display their dissatisfaction on different levels.   Paul voiced that sometimes, their anger 
is even more direct like depictions of angry coaches in Hollywood films: “We have only 
lost one match. [when we lost the match] the coach was very angry he destroyed every 
dust pan away so so mad.  They are violent.”  
A player by signing a contract becomes dependent upon a manager’s approval in 
order to receive their full wages and to play in a game.  Thus a player is subject to a 
manager by control and dependence.  The ultimate form of control and enforcement is 
what Foucault’s describes as surveillance within his example of a panopticon, which is 
described in the next section.   
Enforcing Rules through Fear of Surveillance 
 
When I was playing in Ghana I was doing a whole lot. You can move around and 
have all the fun.  We used to go around in the car and go to the club.  In Ghana, 
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they don’t put so much pressure on you the footballer. You just have fun... In 
Ghana the coach is more, he more cares about what is on the field not off the 
field.  But we all know off the field too is all part of the professional. And it is all 
part of the football but at least you are given space to do something for yourself 
whether what you want to do. Not like here you understand? –Castro, Ghana 
 
The rules can only be enforced effectively if the manager is able to monitor a 
player’s behavior.  The football club is an institution that uses the manager as a 
heightened watchful gaze that looks over the players.  We can understand further the 
manager’s technique of surveillance and discipline through Michel Foucault’s theory 
articulated in the book Discipline and Punish (1995).  The technologies and knowledge 
connected to biopower seek to “control, regulate and dominate people to make them 
docile bodies” (Danaher et al 2002:66).  Technologies of power used by football 
managers are a mechanism to regulate football players.  One technique that Foucault 
discuses, is surveillance through the example of a panopticon17, the ideal prison whose 
inmates come to discipline or regulate their own behavior because they are could be 
under observation at any moment.  Foucault describes the advent of prisons as a means to 
a more controlled form of punishment.  Previously, punishment has been carried out by 
public chain gangs, which was used during an interperiod between public torture and 
prisons.  The prison serves as an institutional center of punishment whose method of 
discipline is surveillance (Foucault 1995:195).  African football players are subjected to 
panopticon-like surveillance in multiple ways.  
African football players modify their behavior to act as they are supposed to act 
according to institutionalized knowledge imposed on the body through disciplinary 
                                                17 Designed by Jeremy Bentham, the panopticon allowed for observation of all cells within a prison, but 
the prisoners were unable to know for certain if they were ever being watched.  Therefore prisoners would 
have to adjust their behavior in fear of being watched to avoid bad behavior thus punishment. 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practices of managers and Egyptian cultural discourses.  When Henry was invited to a 
concert with some friends of mine, he agreed to come to the concert, but he claimed he 
would have to disguise himself in order to attend.  However, when the night came, Henry 
was too paranoid and canceled.  He explained the evening before, after winning their 
game, some of his Egyptian teammates went to a club in celebration, others recognized 
them at the club and their attendance was reported to the manager who fined the Egyptian 
players, by withholding part of their salary.  Like a prisoner in a panopticon, Henry and 
other players never really know when they are being watched.  Therefore, Henry feels 
compelled to disguise himself in order to avoid recognition by someone who could 
possibly jeopardize his paycheck and his relationship with his manager.  
The football club provides Henry an apartment where he lives with Egyptian 
teammates.  By providing him with an apartment, Henry supposes that the club abuses 
this privilege of controlling where he lives. He is certain that the club influences those in 
the building to keep a watch on him including his boweb (doorman), who he insists, 
watches his every move.  Additionally, Ricky, whose contract ended over the summer 
2010, was encouraged to sleep and live on the club grounds in their small apartments, 
which they provide for the team.  However, he refused and found his own place to live, 
having no desire to live in the clubhouse and believing that the club would restrict his 
lifestyle.  
Added to this is the fact that football players are public figures whose faces are 
recognizable by some members of society who are not affiliated with the club.  Multiple 
players have complained to me that Egyptians gossip a lot.  When I was discussing other 
players with Castro and Martin, they mentioned one player in particular, and Castro 
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apologized for not having invited him when he realized that I had not interviewed him.  
Their friend used to live about an hour’s drive from where he played and practiced.  
When I asked why this was the case, Castro explained that “it is [name of club] you 
know, people talk… you want to stay far away from where you play.  Egyptians gossip a 
lot.”  Both Maleek and Paul also chose to live to farther away from where they played to 
have more “freedom.”  To try to avoid the panopticon they try to live away from it as 
much as possible in order to attempt to distance themselves from the watchful gaze.  
Despite distances that they manage to create, players never feel truly free of this gaze 
because they never know who is observing them.  This is the antithesis of a panopticon 
that those within it are unable to know when they are being watched.  The uniqueness of 
their panopticon is that they know they are being watched in certain situations. 
The idea of surveillance for a player can happen through others observing them in 
public or surveillance of their bodies through physical examination by a team doctor or 
during practice by the team manager.  Punishment or penal procedures move beyond the 
prison creating a carceral continuum18.  These institutions create discourses and rules that 
regulate behavior.  These rules are “written” into the bodies of football players by 
structure time, space, and relations.   
Cultural Adjustments: Subjective Narratives About Egypt  
 You are in another atmosphere [that] they create.  I mean an exclusive 
atmosphere for themselves; they want everyone to go again towards the 
atmosphere, which is very difficult. –Martin, Ghana 
Martin believes that this ‘atmosphere’ is all-inclusive.  It constrains you to act a certain 
way or make certain decisions in your everyday life.  The ‘atmosphere’ or cultural sphere 
                                                18 The Foucauldian process by which punishment or penal procedures move beyond the prison into other 
parts of life. 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is so strong that it limits players from living a lifestyle they prefer.   This ‘atmosphere’ 
can be interpreted as the subjectification that the players experience that relates to the 
rules above, but also the unique cultural situations in Egypt.  Egyptian cultural practices 
are by all means a large presence in the lives of African football players.  Their job 
requires them to interact and work with a large number of Egyptians from multiple 
classes and multiple educational backgrounds almost on a daily basis.   African football 
players are more engrossed in Egyptian cultural practices than the average foreign 
expatriate in Egypt.  Their subjective experience creates interesting narratives about 
Egyptians and Egyptian football that are not always clearly a result of club rules, but are 
reflective of a cultural regime that exists in their everyday lives.   
Differing Discourses About Religion 
 
Hassan Sheheta, the former Egyptian National football coach stated during the 
build up to the 2010 African Cup of Nations that not only skills and competence, but also 
piety is important in selecting his squad.  The Egyptian squad’s nickname the Pharaohs is 
slowly changing to Montakhab El Sagedeen, which Osama Diab translates literally to the 
team of prostrates.  The act of prostration in Islam is a religious act that “expresses 
gratitude” to god after achieving something.  It is not unusual for national team players 
and Egyptian league players to drop on their knees after scoring in thanks to God (Diab 
2010:1). 
The Associated Press quoted Hassan Sheheta as saying, “without [piety], we will 
never select any player regardless of his potential.  I always strive to make sure that those 
who wear the Egypt jersey are on good terms with God” (Diab 2010:1).  Al Shorouk 
newspaper further reported that Hassan Sheheta had purposely left Egyptian striker, 
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Mido19 off the team because he once styled his hair with a ponytail and dated Miss 
Belgium 2000 (Diab 2010:1).  Sheheta’s statements are symbolic of changes in Egyptian 
society since the 1980’s that have now resulted in an extremely less secular society that 
has been replaced by rapid Islamicization and the protection of traditional values from 
encroaching foreign influence.  Egypt’s population numbers around 79 million.  It is 
estimated that ten percent of the population are Christian while the remainder and 
majority are Sunni Muslims (Central Intelligence Agency 2010:1).    Similar to club 
rules, players view Egyptian religious practices as a restricting regime in their lives.  This 
is not to say religion is not important to the players, it is quite the contrary, but the way 
their religion is practiced in Egypt differs greatly from their home countries.   
Religion is an important aspect of the lives of many of the football players.  I 
interviewed Thomas on church grounds, where he spends every Friday attending church 
services, “I have not missed one church service since I have arrived in Egypt.”  Castro 
describes pre-game ritual, which always includes reading the bible and praying, “On a 
game day I probably read the bible and pray a little bit, sleep, eat a little bit.  I don’t eat a 
lot because when I eat a lot I cannot play I cannot even run. That is it.”  His friend 
Martin, a Muslim recites the Koran on game day, “On game day I just recite the Koran, 
just recite it.  There are some verses inside it, which normally if you read you get luck to 
win the match.  So I wrote and I had it on my notes.”  
African players perceive religion in Egypt, in particular the way Islam is practiced 
in Egypt, as a restricting force in their lives.  They correlate the Egyptian practice of 
                                                
19 Known simply as Mido, Ahmed Hossam Hussein Abdelhamid is a top Egyptian player who has been 
caped 51 times for the Egyptian National Team.  His professional football career has mostly taken place in 
Europe rather than in Egypt.   
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Islam as a defining cultural practice.  When talking about the differences between Islam 
in Ghana and Egypt, Martin explained “yeah it [Islam] is very different.  Here it is 
difficult.  In Ghana, everything is one, here it is different. Here you cannot live.”  Martin 
was referencing his inability to have “freedom” in Egypt, which prevents him from living 
the same lifestyle he led in Ghana.  Castro further explained that in Ghana, there is 
ambiguity, “here [in Egypt] it is easy for you to identify a Muslim.  In Ghana, it is 
difficult [to identify someone] unless the person tells you…Muslims go to the church, 
Christians go around the mosque.  They don’t care.  Ghana is the place to be.”  
For Christians, playing with a majority of Muslims can be a culture shock.   It can 
be said that the religious influence on Egyptian culture is embodied in some club rules 
especially interactions with women.  Players are subject to religious codes through club 
rules.  Interestingly enough players never make this correlation.  They almost always 
separate the restricting nature of club rules from Egyptian religious regimes.  Fred was 
the only one who even mentioned religion in his club and even then he did not correlate 
with club rules.  Instead, he complained about how as a Christian he is not treated with 
the same respect as a Muslim: “they take the religious aspect of your football our of 
yourself, if you are Christian.  They [Egyptian teammates] have tried to convert me; they 
wanted to force me to convert.  They will not like you [if you are Christian], they will 
treat you without respect.”   
Egyptians are African! : Narratives of Egyptian African Identity 
 
Despite the various nationalities of the African players I interviewed, they all 
seemed to be frustrated with the fact that Egyptians did not view themselves as African.  
These players view Egypt as African, but then immediately elaborate Egyptian culture is 
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different from their own.  There is a tension within their narratives that tries to identify 
Egyptians as African, but the narratives cannot overlook the cultural differences that the 
players encounter.  Egyptians in their minds are a special kind of African who thinks 
differently from other Africans.  Napoleon voiced this complex idea that Egyptians are 
African, but than they are ‘different’: “Sometimes Egyptians …are different from other 
Africans because of their culture.  They do not think they are African.  When they see 
black players they call them African, but they are African, they do not consider 
themselves African.”   
This also relates to frustrations as being perceived as a foreign player and the 
limitations on the number of foreign players in Egyptian clubs.  Castro believed that 
Egyptians are African and therefore Africans should not be viewed as foreign players in 
Egypt, but as local players: 
If one day I should have the chance to meet the CAF, African football people… 
when I have the chance to meet them, I would tell them that it has to change in 
Egypt.  Egypt is an African country.  Tunisia is an African country.  All these 
people are African countries.  If they want to get a player in the same, they want 
three foreigners then if someone is from America he has to be a foreigner they do 
what we do.  If someone is from Afghanistan, Iraq, Germany, then they need to 
do what we do, but if you are African this is Africa [by this time his voice was 
louder. His speech more rapid and his tone clearly frustrated].  This is not 
America.  This is not Europe.  This is Africa. So they have to understand that this 
is Africa if they want a foreign player and an African player comes in here, than 
he is not a foreign player he is an African player then he has to play.  This is what 
I think has to stop because look in Europe.  In Europe, it is open.  Exactly it is 
open in Europe, so why what is happening in Africa.  That it cannot open. What 
are they doing? 
However Martin states after Castro stops talking that Egyptians cannot afford more than 
three players: “They are talking about their economic standard. They can’t afford it. You 
see they can’t afford it.  Egyptians cannot afford to take care of more than three 
foreigners in one club.”  However later in our interview both Martin and Castro complain 
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that Africans are paid less, not only in Egypt, but globally.  Seen as unfair, they believe 
Africans need to stop being viewed as cheap labor, which was discussed in chapter five.  
My understanding is that African players are cheaper than Egyptians in most 
circumstances and both Martin and Castro have asserted this was true.  What Martin is 
possibly getting at is that it would not be popular with fans if they employ large numbers 
of foreign players, which could lead to a fan revolt.     Egyptian fans are often very vocal 
if they are unhappy with teams or regulations especially Ultras groups. 
They find it frustrating to be singled out as a foreigner in Egypt where they 
struggle with a complex set of objective conditions and their subjective experiences.  This 
frustration is bigger than just pan-Africanism, it links itself to the frustration of living in 
Egypt and cultural differences.  They know they are in Africa, but they perceive the 
culture as nothing like it is at home.  It is seen as far more restrictive in mobility and 
social interaction, but they are unable to escape it.  This plays into discourses about 
“freedom” and choice.  African players continually feel that are not at home when they 
compare styles of play even though they are in Africa.   
Egyptian Style of Play verses “African” Style of Play 
On the playing field, players perceive the Egyptian style of play as more 
aggressive and organized while they describe themselves and other African players as 
having a more ‘Brazilian’ style of play, meaning more creative, freeing and fun.  Castro 
could easily describe the Ghanaian style of play, but was loss for words when trying to 
find a country comparative to Egypt: 
Yeah [there is] a big difference[between Egyptian and Ghanaian football].  A big 
big difference. In Ghana, we play, the people of Ghana when we are playing 
football, we play with more fun, it is more like the Brazilian way of play where 
they go to the field to have fun to play football and then whatever the score is 
whoever wins wins but here it is more … 
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Martin interjected and stated “pressure moments” while Castro reflected and built up 
Martin’s idea of pressure within Egyptian football: 
There’s pressure there is a lot of pressure. They [Egyptians] want to win they. 
You know what I am saying.  They do everything to win.  In Ghana it is more the 
fun part of it where you go and you have fun and play and you excite the people 
who come to watch, but here it is not, it is not about excitement. It’s just playing 
and let my team win.  So Ghanaian football is more like the Brazilian football and 
here it is something else I do not know which other countries to compare [it to].  
 
The understanding that Egyptian style of football is different is coupled with the 
understanding that Egyptian football has had more success in terms of organization and 
monetary reward while also being less “free” and more stressful.  Charles believes this 
correlates with football’s relatively high popularity in Egypt: “The difference is that 
football here is more organized than Nigerian football.  More people play in Egypt, they 
are more obsessed.”  Egypt’s football industry is seen as more competitive and allows a 
player to grow because of the exposure to a different style of play.  Ricky even went to an 
extreme to say that he can play anywhere now because of having played in Egypt: “If you 
can play in Egypt you can play anywhere because man marking20 is so common here.   
You have to have perseverance to get past these markers.  The level of play is harder.”  
To move past these markers, it takes not only perseverance, but aggression on the field, 
which is a necessary skill in Egyptian football according to Paul, “Egypt likes aggressive 
players.  If you are not aggressive they will not even look or sign you.”  
As I did further research, it became apparent that most African players play 
forward or mid-field position and hardly ever on the defensive line.  This is 
                                                20 Man marking or man-to-man marking is a defensive strategy used by teams to prevent opposing 
forwards from obtaining the ball by using a player to block the opposing player.  Man-to-man marking is 
when a player is assigned a specific player to mark during the duration of the game instead of certain area 
of the field.   
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representative of stereotypes held by both Egyptians and African players themselves that 
African players are more energetic and driven.   Castro explained to me that this relates to 
football culture where African players for instance in Ghana grow up playing street 
football, which develops certain skills that make Ghanaians better forwards or mid-
fielders: 
You know the problem is… see in Ghana, we start football on the streets.  And 
When you play street football [it] makes you skillful because when you play street 
football lets say you go to the street at 4 o’clock every 4 o’clock you go to the 
street and then you have about twenty or thirty young kids like you and you guys 
have to play just one ball. So when you are playing, all you have to do is protect 
then ball.  So when I have the ball I don’t want to lose it to someone else so it 
makes you learn how to dribble because you don’t want to lose it you don’t want 
to give it to this one.  So growing up it makes…it brings the skills in us out.  So it 
either makes you a mid-fielder or a striker.  
After Castro finished, I posed the question whether the Ghanaian national team is awful 
at defense seeing that Castro’s explanation would lend itself to an understanding that the 
situation in Ghana is not suitable to the development of a solid defense.  His response 
almost negates what he had explained previously, by stating the Ghanaian national team 
lacks strikers, “Most of the time we, the Ghanaian National Team, we are lacking strikers 
that is a problem with Ghanaian team we are lacking strikers, but I think maybe they 
should start something from the junior level strikers.” 
 Castro’s friend, Martin went on to explain that Egyptians train their own players 
to play defense and that they want to import attackers or strikers: 
And one thing too, let me add, I mean playing back as defensive to go outside 
[Ghana] to get a club and be defensive because each country like Egyptian they 
don’t want defenders, they want either attackers or strikers.  They will train their 
own Egyptians [players] to be defenders. They will train them. Yeah to be 
defending and you as a foreigner to be striking because we we get extra energy. 
That is what they are saying. 
Like Martin who perceives himself as someone with extra energy because he is African 
and a forward, Charles believes that Africans tend to play in more attacking positions 
 119 
“because we have a fighting spirit that is why we are always forwards.”  This idea that 
Ghanaians and other African have extra energy is propagated not only by Africans 
themselves, but also the Egyptian football industry.  Castro, who out of all the players 
was the most vocal, the most descriptive, found this stereotype to be very upsetting.  He 
believes that it creates high expectations that misuse African players: 
That is what I don’t believe in that is what I hate.  I don’t want to hear that. That 
mentality of… that mentality in Egypt has to stop.  Where by when they see an 
African player they think that oh this guy that want you to play as a defender as a 
striker.  They want you to play here they want you to play there.  They want you 
to move around and do everything on the field. An African is an African. He is 
the same blood that is in you. If you have an Egyptian who is a defender that you 
use him on defense alone…  We have to use an African player when his playing 
as mid field use him as mid-field alone, but here they want you to go play as a 
striker come back just because you are African because they think we Africans we 
have I don’t know, a certain ass that can run for a hundred minutes. It is wrong.  It 
is just because we are more determined.  
Though Castro criticizes the stereotypes that African players are more energetic, he still 
distinguishes Africans from others by stating that they are more “determined.” However 
determination requires a certain form of conduct and work ethnic that is demonstrated 
through certain kinds actions and attributes, one of which could be energetic, which is 
required to succeed during football matches.  Thus Castro, unintentionally stereotypes 
African players the same way that Egyptians and other African players do, despite his 
own anger towards this stereotype.  These stereotypes and identity are part of the player’s 
subjectification as the player is “tied to his own identity by a conscience or self-
knowledge” (Foucalt 1994:331).   Discourses about West African football players is a 
form of power that marks the players of his individuality, which Foucault elaborates 
“attaches him to his own identity, imposes a law of truth on him that he must recognize 
and others have to recognize in him” (1994:331).    These players are marked of a certain 
identity that they thus accepted such as Africans are energetic.  
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Sore Losers: Egyptian Football Fandom  
“If there are fans and we lost the game, they yell at us on the street.  If we win, 
they say hi and go.  The fans here are crazy.” – Maleek, from Nigeria 
In 2007, enthusiastic Egyptian fans brought a supporter style called Ultras to Egypt 
(Charbel 2009: 1).  The term Ultras was coined in the 1960’s by hard-core football fans 
in Northern Italy, as a form of supporter style and culture (Giulianotti and Robertson 
2007: 67). Ultra means beyond in Latin; it indicates that the fan’s enthusiasm is beyond 
the expected or normal quantity of the average fan.  The Ultras work in groups to produce 
elaborate fanatical displays of support of a team during competitions (Mazhar 2009:1).  
Egypt has localized these traditions of Ultras spectatorship.  Ultras in Egypt are formed 
and supported monetarily by well-educated leaders from typically upper-class families.   
 There are five Ultras fan groups in Egypt Ultras Ahlawy (Al Ahly), White 
Knights (Zamalek), Yellow Dragons (Ismaili), Green Eagles (Masri), and Ultras 300 
(Tanta).  Inas Mazhar describes their support as behavioral tendencies including “the use 
of flares primarily in TIFO21 choreography, vocal support in large groups, defiance of 
authorities, and the display of banners at football stadiums, which are used to create an 
atmosphere, which intimidates opposing players and supporters” (2009:1).   Violent 
hooliganism is not uncommon with Ultras groups.  After a loss against the Army’s team, 
members of the White Knight Ultras group had pelted soldiers with stones in revenge. 
Nine white knights were charged with assaulting soldiers following this match in 2008 
(Charbel 2009:2).   
                                                
21 TIFO are choreographed displays of support for football teams.  They usually involve a large group of 
people that either hold up a large banner or hold colored cards in mosaic patterns that can possible spell or 
create an image that symbolize the team.  It could also involve a mixture of both, as well as flags, 
streamers, and jerseys.  A TIFO does last longer than several minutes. 
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 Violence is not solely a form of emotion and competition between competing 
sides, but is a purposeful form of encouragement for one’s own team (Charbel 2009:2).  
A member of White Knights explained to Jano Charbel.  “In fact, we Ultras sometimes 
attack our own club members and managers when their performances fall into decline. 
This is our way of encouraging them to improve their performance,” (2009:2).  African 
football players substantiate this claim. Beyond Ultras Fan groups, Egyptian fans of the 
local Egyptian leagues also react violently to loss of their home teams.  Some African 
players choose to live outside of their local neighborhoods to avoid being recognized in 
the street and attacked by Egyptians when their team loses.  Henry explained: 
Some people [Egyptians] recognize us, some places because we train there. My 
club is in Maadi and if one time you play bad and people attack you in your 
house.  In Europe they accept defeat.  Here they want to win every time so when 
you don’t, they do not understand.  They have high expectations. 
Fred chooses to deny his identity when Egyptians recognize him on street, “people get 
attacked because they do not play well. They [Egyptians] will attack, I change my name 
because I do not want people on the street to talk to me when they recognize me. I tell 
them [that] I am a student and I am not a footballer.”  The fear of attack perpetuates an 
idea among players that Egyptians cannot handle losing even though someone always has 
to lose.  Players fear Egyptians fans because they believe fans are violent others despite 
the fact that they support the team that the footballer plays for.   
Mohammed, the agent who is already disliked by football clubs themselves 
because he strives to find contracts for players in Europe, fears Ultras groups. “I am 
afraid to get attacked by the fans because I move their players.  The press has a lot to do 
with it.  The press helps dramatize and make it worse for the fans.”  Despite the concerns 
of Mohammed and other players, one Zamalek player told me that the Ultras were the 
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best fans in the stadium.  He went on to say that Egyptian fans help to make Egypt a very 
good place to play because of their passion and love for the game.  Ultras and fans create 
a unique atmosphere in which football players compete and live.  Ultras and fans remind 
players of their public identity in friendly and unfriendly ways. 
Conclusion 
 
The body is ultimately very important to a player’s career on the field; however, a 
player’s body is not solely an apparatus to perform and play the football game.  The 
manager uses multiple techniques to control players.  Fining, fear of observation, lack of 
support, and indirect forms of punishment such as delaying their salaries are ways in 
which these managers discipline their players to provoke them to behave in certain ways.  
Their rules move beyond the field or the clubhouse to the players’ private lives in order to 
control them further.  It is through these techniques of power forced upon the body of 
these players that they become objectified.  Neoliberalism’s influence on the economic 
and social systems around the world has facilitated the decommodification of football 
players in some sense, yet this decrease is not reflected in how clubs view players, both 
they and players themselves continue to use commodifying language to speak of players, 
for example, describing them as being bought and sold. Within Egypt, they are no less 
objectified than previously.  Football players are by all means aware that their manager is 
trying to control them. What has changed are the methods through which players are 
objectified which have developed a long clearly neoliberal lines.  Players blame this 
controlling nature on the Egyptian football system and Egyptian cultural traditions.  Yet 
they are aware of some of the processes of commodification, through they are unable to 
express it using these terms.  As a result of their objectification, they view Egyptian as a 
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cultural place, which requires them to adjust to it when living here.  The way in which 
they are subjectified to a regime is inseparable form their subjectivity as individual who 
understand themselves and their experiences. 
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Conclusion 
 
 The primary goal of this thesis was to document the process of sub-Saharan 
football labor migration into Egypt by understanding how economic and state policy, as 
well as individual actors, facilitate this migration and affect the localized experience of 
football players in Egypt.   What players expressed through their narratives of migration, 
club treatment, and Egyptian culture is that there are multiple individuals that affect their 
experience of migration to Egypt within their own national domestic leagues and the 
Egyptian football industry.   All of these individual actors have a vested interest in each 
player.  The player’s body is a site of multiple types of values (including use-value and 
exchange-value) that these individuals seek to take advantage of and often increase using 
multiple techniques, such as facilitating their migration, human capital investment, and 
controlling the body by objectifying the player into a subject.  It is their subjective 
experience that negotiates their migration to Egypt and the life they establish.   In 
collecting these narratives, this thesis has come to understand the extent of 
neoliberalism’s range within the life and work experiences of an African football labor 
migrant in Egypt by answering the following questions: What role does Egypt play in this 
larger global football industry?  How do players view Egypt within the global football 
industry?  What is experience of this role by football players in Egypt?  How does 
Egypt’s role within the neoliberal global football industry enable and facilitate sub-
Saharan football labor migration to Egypt? How do these players navigate these 
hegemonic regimes of influence in their everyday lives?  
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Egypt and the Global Industry 
With the exception of Martin, sub-Saharan African players have one common 
goal: to play for European teams.  This research came to understand that they use Egypt 
as a nodal point or a “go-between” as the sports agent, Mohammed called it, in order to 
transition from Africa to Europe.  They see Egypt as a transit destination where they wait 
for the next opportunity to arise in order to move on to better venues or circumstances.  
The players will likely leave as better-trained and with a higher price and use-value.  That 
said, there are players who remain in Egypt longer than they anticipate, such as Napoleon 
who has been in Egypt for over six years. The ideal situation, however, would involve 
playing in Egypt and either be transferred to Europe before the end of their contract or 
obtaining a European contract after two years playing in Egypt.  The way players view 
Egypt as a passing phase, a place of transit, in their personal football careers is 
comparable to Egypt’s role within the global football industry. 
World systems theory posits that labor is organized and divided through core-
periphery relations.  The global football industry is no different and maintains divisions 
of labor.  Egypt’s place within the global football industry lies within the semi-periphery.   
The Egyptian football industry is not exactly a part of the core, but has moved away from 
being in the periphery.  As a part of the semi-periphery, Egypt shares many aspects with 
both the core and the periphery.  Yet, the core exploits the semi-periphery while the latter 
simultaneously exploits the periphery (Wallerstein 1976: 231).   As Wallerstein (1976) 
described the semi-periphery, Egypt provides a connection and facilitates communication 
between the core and the periphery through its industry and by being the headquarters of 
the African Football Federation (CAF).  The Egyptian football leagues are far more 
developed and maintain much larger amounts of capital than the countries where the 
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players I interviewed emigrated.  Football labor migration to Egypt is representative of 
this movement between the semi-periphery and periphery.  Egypt is much easier to 
migrate to than Europe and most players interpret Egypt as a place of transit that will 
create more opportunities for future travel/migration to Europe.   There is a lower amount 
of spatial obstacles in comparison to the core, which allows for easier mobility between 
states.  If Egypt did not limit the amount of foreign labor per team to three bodies, based 
on this research it could be foreseeable that Egypt would encounter a larger influx of 
football labor migrants because there would be more available positions; thus creating 
more capital for agents to accumulate, as well as more sub-Saharan Africans traveling 
independent of an agent because of the lowered boundaries.   
Neoliberalism’s Range 
 
The neoliberal project has made certain processes, such as deregulation, 
commercialization, privatization, and the accrual of large amounts of capital, the center 
of its belief system.  The Egyptian football industry has adopted many of these processes, 
which have increased football labor migration globally.  Neoliberalism in Egypt has 
changed the way professional football players play, live, and work.  Local actors have 
implemented and taken advantage of the neoliberal project.  Football agents have used 
loosened foreign player quotas, straightforward visa processing between sub-Saharan 
Africa and Egypt, and deregulation of the labor market as a means to move and funnel 
significant quantities of foreign labor to Egypt.   
 The human sciences have agreed that neoliberalism is the most important 
contemporary force of social and economic change, although a disagreement about 
neoliberalism’s range remains (Ong 2006:11).  Certainly neoliberalism is not absolute in 
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the Egyptian football industry nor does not it completely define the industry.  By 
examining the nature of the Egyptian football industry this research yielded several 
interesting finding about the impact of neoliberalism on the Egyptian football industry.  
More specifically there are four exceptions where the industry lacks certain neoliberal 
thought 1) privatization is limited; 2) full commercialization is not realized 3) investment 
in human capital; 4) counter-results of deregulation and free agency.   
As described in chapter one, Egyptian law has limited the deregulation of the 
Egyptian football industry in comparison to Europe, despite IMF restructuring programs 
in the 1990s and pressure from FIFA.  Privatization of the industry is limited and former 
President Hosni Mubarak capitalized politically on the football industry in Egypt.  A 
large percentage of clubs in Egypt are still owned by government ministries, which fund 
teams in all divisions.   The decrease in funding seen in other sports during the 1990s did 
not affect the Egyptian football industry as much.   
Furthermore, the commercialization of football, especially in terms of sports 
marketing, has not been fully realized.  Within the Egyptian legal code there remain 
restrictions on non-profit clubs from establishing commercial companies that will allow 
them to merchandize and leverage their assets, including player contracts (Dorsey 
2001f:1).  The Egyptian revolution and President Hosni Mubarak’s resignation put on 
hold a law that would allow clubs to commercialize completely.  In addition, other 
legislature that would reform Egyptian telecommunications law has also been put on hold 
and will not be addressed until after parliamentary elections in September 2011.  These 
changes would abolish the exclusive broadcast rights held by Egyptian 
telecommunications authorities, which maintain the sole license of uplinks.  This would 
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simultaneously take away state run television’s exclusive right to broadcast anything 
(including football) that happens within Egypt (Dorsey 2011f:1).  Commercialization of 
the industry is thus limited to certain forms including team sponsorship, billboard 
advertising within stadiums, and limited merchandising.  From the point of neoliberalism, 
the football industry is over-regulated and does not serve to create large amounts of 
capital in the industry because of its lack of privatization and commercialization. 
Thirdly, the nature of the football industry requires clubs to invest in the well 
being of their product by investing in the human capital of their players, which in a 
neoliberal age is contrary to emerging practices.  The club requires able bodies in order to 
compete and generate the product they are selling, which is technically the spectacle of 
competition.  Therefore the labor needs to be maintained in ways that other industries do 
not require.  Lastly, despite the de-commodification of football players through the 
creation of free agency and deregulation of labor markets, football clubs and managers do 
not view players as less of a commodity.  In fact, players in Egypt are very much 
objectified and made subject to control and dependence on football clubs and managers 
for income, visa support, and attention to their professional development.   
Commodification and Subjectivity 
 
The thesis further looked into theories on commodification and subjectivity and 
how these apply to the individual player’s experience in Egypt.  A football player’s body 
is a site of value that changes based on national origin of the player, his skill, his age, and 
his current location.  Their bodies and values are always being shaped by others, 
including sports agents and managers, into a certain product and type of individual.  
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Forms of commodification and objectification are how managers and sports agents shape 
and manipulate football players and their values.   
As the research has shown, the skill of a player determines their value; however, 
this value is relative to where the player is located.  The value can increase and decrease 
based on what country the player is playing in, such as between Egypt and other African 
countries due to differences in available capital between countries.  The price 
discrepancies between African player’s home countries and Egypt allow for agents and 
clubs to commodify the individual players through labor arbitrage.  This territorialization 
of values creates incentives for agents to broaden professional networks abroad to allow 
them to benefit from labor arbitrage.   
The differential values as a result of territorialization also encourage football 
clubs to invest in their players’ human capital in order to create surplus value while the 
player is under contract in order to be able to trade the player to more profitable teams 
within Egypt and abroad.   In addition, a sub-Saharan player’s age can determine not only 
his monetary value, but also his marketability as younger players have the ability to gain 
larger differential changes in price and use-value than older players.   
Closing Remarks: Taking into Account the Egyptian Revolution 
 
Egypt erupted in protests against ex-President Hosni Mubarak several months 
after my field research had been completed.  Beginning on the 25th of January 2011, the 
demonstrations lasted eighteen days, ending with Mubarak’s resignation from office on 
February 11th.  As a result of the viotile situation in Egypt, the Egyptian Football 
Federation postponed all football activity across Egypt for six weeks at the end of 
January.  The cancellations were not solely a result of the destruction and paralysis that 
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took over Cairo and much of Egypt, but it was also a political choice.  Football was not 
isolated from the political revolution, but remained linked with political discourses from 
both pro-democracy and pro-Mubarak positions (Dorsey 2011c:1).  The Egyptian 
Football Federation sought to prevent football stadiums, fields, and matches from 
becoming spaces for mass demonstrations, thus solidifying their loyalty towards 
President Mubarak (Dorsey 2011c:1). There were proposals to continue the league as 
normal without supporters in the stands.  Ahly immediately rejected this idea, while 
Zamalek and the head coach of the national team, Hassan Sheheta, supported the 
proposal (Dorsey 2011a: 1).   
Individual members of the football industry came out in support of the protesters, 
including former Zamalek goalie, Nader El Sayed, Zamalek’s head coach Hossam 
Hassan, and Egyptian football star, Mido (Corbett 2011:1).  Multiple media sources 
stated that football fans, specifically members of Ultras fan clubs, played significant roles 
in the pro-democracy movement because they are accustomed to and knowledgeable 
about confrontations with Egyptian police (Kirkpatrick and Sanger 2011:A1; Woodward 
2011:1; Dorsey 2011b:1).  The institutionalized elements of the industry and sport that 
had previously been manipulated by Mubarak’s regime to create a national conscience, 
completely turned against President Mubarak in the popular uprising.  As such, the 
change in power and the potential democratic reforms that lies ahead could ultimately 
result in vast changes in Egyptian society that will affect Egypt’s football industry in the 
long-term.    
Writing in the immediate post-revolution era, this research cannot predict which 
direction the Egyptian football industry will take. However, proposals have already been 
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advanced including salary and trade caps.  Charges of corruption have been made against 
Mubarak’s Petroleum Minister, Sameh Fahmy, who gave generous handouts to football 
clubs owned by the ministry, including Eneppi and Petrojet, as well as division two 
teams, Gasco and Petrol Asyut (Dorsey 2011f:1).  His successor is viewed as less 
inclined to give clubs large amounts of funding.  Moreover, shifts in social, legal, and 
economic policies will allow for increased fluidity of the Egyptian football industry, 
including football labor migration in and out of Egypt.  These fluid processes need to be 
addressed in future research about football in Egypt.  It is a double-edged sword for the 
Egyptian football industry as Egypt’s future is still not clear; impending reforms could 
possibly increase football labor migration greatly while renewed violence could be 
detrimental to African football labor migration to Egypt.   
As Egyptians continue to voice their concerns about government practices and 
spending, funding of football most likely will be criticized.  Football will lose large 
monetary amounts of support and will have to look elsewhere.  It is foreseeable that 
Egyptian football will experience large amounts of privatization and commercialization, 
as citizens demand transparency on government spending.  Football fans have already 
demanded reforms within the industry.   Perhaps in regards to football, citizens might 
actually welcome neoliberalization and privatization in Egypt. 
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